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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Kenneth M. Murchison*
The stream of reported decisions involving local governments as
litigants continues to flow unabated. In addition to state decisions in
a wide variety of contexts, including the status of local governments
vis-a-vis the state,1 election controversies,2 land use planning,3 public
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University
1. West v. Allen, 382 So. 2d 924 (La. 1980); ACORN v. City of New Orleans, 377
So.2d 1206 (La. 1979); Rollins Envirn. Serv. v. Iberville Parish, 371 So. 2d 1127 (La.
1979). See notes 18-41, infra, and accompanying text. See also City of Baton Rouge v.
Hebert, 378 So. 2d 144 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 380 So. 2d 1210 (La. 1980)
(state's preemption in field of oil production and storage did not preclude a city from
enforcing its normal land use regulations to the construction of oil storage tanks).
2. See, e.g., Roussel v. Keller, 379 So. 2d 81 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (court rejects election challenge on the ground that minor mistakes in recording name by poll
workers were insufficient to invalidate an election); McCarter v. Broom, 377 So. 2d 383
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1979) (candidate's effort to establish domicile within a reasonable
time after court-ordered redistricting was sufficient even if the change in domicile was
not actually accomplished until after the qualification date). See also Dupre v. Lafourche
Parish Police Jury, 376 So. 2d 986 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979) (police jury must provide
plaintiff with form of petition to call a referedum seeking repeal of solid waste ordinance passed by the parish); Lehmann v. Musgrave, 374 So. 2d 1284 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 So. 2d 645 (La. 1979) (by becoming a candidate for public office,
member of fire and police civil service board vacated his position); Toldson v. Fair, 374
So. 2d 759 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 So. 2d 1182 (La. 1979) (domicile provisions for candidates in newly reapportioned districts apply to reapportionments that
are judically ordered).
3. See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Donelon, 383 So. 2d 433
(La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 So. 2d 274 (La. 1980) (amendments to parish's
comprehensive zoning code are unenforceable because the parish failed to comply with
the code's requirements for notice and public hearing); Coogan v. Parish of Jefferson,
381 So. 2d 1320 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (court orders parish to rezone plaintiffs property on grounds that, notwithstanding the residential zoning of the area, area was commercial because of the existence of numerous nonconforming commercial uses); City of
Baton Rouge v. Causey, 380 So. 2d 136 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d
24 (La. 1980) (city does not need to show irreparable harm to secure an injunction requiring compliance with its zoning ordinance); City of Baton Rouge v. Hebert, 378 So.
2d 144 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 380 So. 2d 1210 (La. 1980) (court enjoins
building of four large storage tanks on a tract as an enlargement of a preexisting use
as an oil well); West v. City of Lake Charles, 375 So. 2d 206 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 378 So. 2d 435 (La. 1979) (city's zoning ordinance constitutes the comprehensive
plan required by the state enabling act); City of Kenner v. Kenner Academy, 373 So.
2d 197 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979) (provision in city ordinance that allows temporary
buildings only in conjunction with construction work does not apply to temporary
buildings used as classrooms at a private academy).
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contacts,' tort liability,5 the public's right to observe the delibera7
tions of meetings of public bodies,6 the extent of the police power,
and public employment,8 the United States Supreme Court rendered
4. See, e.g., Slagle-Johnson Lumber Co., Inc. v. Landis Const. Co., Inc., 379 So.
2d 479 (La. 1980) (statutory lien provision applies to material consumed in construction
but not made part of the permanent structure); Baton Rouge Roofing & Sheetmetal
Cont., Inc. v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 380 So. 2d 151 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1979) (since reroofing of a building was "maintenance" and not "new construction" or a
"major project," school board could perform the reroofing with its own personnel and
without public bid).
5. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980); LeBoyd v. Jenkins, 381 So. 2d
1290 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980); LeBlanc v. Tyler, 381 So. 2d 908 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980);
Hryhorchuk v. Smith, 379 So. 2d 281 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 381 So. 2d
1231 (La. 1980); McKinney v. Greene, 379 So. 2d 69 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 381 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (La. 1980); White v. Richardson, 378 So. 2d 162 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1979); Nolen v. State, 377 So. 2d 586 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Thompson v. Iberville
Parish School Bd., 372 So. 2d 642 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 650
(La. 1979). See notes 233-35, infra, and accompanying text. See also Cheatham v. City
of New Orleans, 378 So. 2d 369 (La. 1979) (city is liable for the death of the plaintiff at
the hands of an off-duty police officer); Applewhite v. City of Baton Rouge, 380 So. 2d
119 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979) (city is liable for the willful misconduct of its police officer
who forced the plaintiff to engage in various sexual acts); Stewart v. Schmeider, 376
So. 2d 1046 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979) (city-parish's failure to follow the rules of its
building code renders it liable to workmen injured at the construction site); Broussard
v. Parish of Jefferson, 375 So. 2d 722 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 So. 2d 119
(La. 1979) (parish had constructive knowledge of a large drain that was uncovered for
four months); Norrell v. City of Monroe, 375 So. 2d 159 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979) (city
liable for false imprisonment committed by one of its police officers).
6. Eastwold v. City of New Orleans, 374 So. 2d 172 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 So. 2d 119 (La. 1979) (holding council meeting during normal business hours
does not violate constitutional rights of city's employees to observe deliberations of
public bodies).
7. Housemaster Corp. v. City of Kenner, 374 So. 2d 1240 (La. 1979) (a city may
exercise its police power to destroy, without compensation, a building that is a menace
to the public health and safety, but the requirements of due process mandate that the
city give the owner notice and a hearing before destroying the building). Cf. State v.
Scallon, 374 So. 2d 1232 (La. 1979) (Sunday closing law is upheld as a valid exercise of
the state's police power against challenges based on the state and federal constitutions); Inn of Hammond, Inc. v. State Dept. of Transportation & Development, 376 So.
2d 1318 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979) (court upholds state regulation of billboards along
federally-financed highways against an equal protection challenge).
8. City of New Orleans v. Police Ass'n of La., 371 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 658 (La. 1979). See notes 122-40, infra, and accompanying text.
Other significant decisions involving local officers and employees include the following:
Collins v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 384 So. 2d 336 (La. 1980) (school board's denial of
sabbatical leave is set aside as arbitrary and capricious); Lamm v. Board of Comm'rs,
378 So. 2d 919 (La. 1979) (hospital board's dismissal of the hospital director is valid
despite the failure to comply with the board's bylaws); Kibodeaux v. Jefferson Parish
School Bd., 381 So. 2d 1268 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (school board can suspend a
tenured teacher for refusing to confer with her supervisors except in the presence of
the parents of her students); City of Kenner v. Lawrence, 376 So. 2d 564 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1979) (sole issue on appeal of a probationary employee is to decide whether the
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significant decisions with respect to the ability of public officials to
discharge employees that are not protected by civil service9 and to
the tort liability of local governments." This year's survey examines
the United States Supreme Court decisions and selected state decisions in the areas of state-local relations, public employment, and
the tort liability of local governments.
STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS

In trying to define the status of Louisiana's local governments11
under the 1974 constitution, one should distinguish two related, but
distinct, issues: (1) whether the local government has authority to
act in a given area; and (2) whether state law prohibits a particular
action. With respect to the authority issue, Louisiana law traditionally regarded all local governments as creatures of the state
authorized to exercise only those powers specifically granted by the
state constitution or state law,"2 but the 1974 constitution
significantly alters this general rule. In sweeping terms, it allows a
local government with a home rule charter to exercise any powers
or to perform any functions "necessary, requisite, or proper for the
management of its affairs," 3 so long as its charter permits. By contrast, governments without home rule charters (denominated "other
local governments" by the constitution) normally exercise only those
powers that are authorized by the constitution or by state law. However, such a non-home rule local government can expand its authoremploying authority has given the applicant a fair opportunity to prove his ability in
the position); Tucker v. Huval, 374 So. 2d 745 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979) (willful evasion of
federal income taxes is not a conviction justifying removal from public office under
state statute); Civil Service Comm'n v. Rochon, 374 So. 2d 164 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979)
(chief administrative officer of New Orleans cannot alter the methods of compensation
set by the city's civil service commission).
9. Branti v. Finkel, 100 S. Ct. 1287 (1980). See notes 94-121, infra, and accompanying text.
10. Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980). See notes 150-91, infra,
and accompaying text.
11. The 1974 constitution defines the term "local governmental subdivision" to include both parishes and municipalities. LA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1 & 2. The current article uses the term "local government" synonymously with the constitution's "local
governmental subdivision" term.
12. See, e.g., City of Shreveport v. Brister, 194 La. 615, 194 So. 566 (1940). See
generally Kean, Local Government and Home Rule, 21 LOY. L. REV. 63, 64-65 (1975).
13. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 5(E) (new home rule governments). A similar rule applies
to existing home rule governments by virtue of the provision allowing them, if their
charters permit, to exercise all powers that section 7 grants to "other local governments." LA. CONST. art. VI, § 5(F). For a more detailed summary of the constitutional
provisions, see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978
Term-Local Government Law, 39 LA. L. REV. 843, 851-52 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Local Government Law-1977-78 Term].
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ity to match that of home rule governments (that is, to encompass
any power or function "necessary, requisite, or proper for the management of its affairs") if the local electorate approves in an election
held for that purpose."
Of course, state law may prohibit a specific action even though
it falls within an area in which a local government has authority to
act. Thus, no local government can exercise any power or function
"inconsistent with" the constitution.1" Moreover, with respect to nonhome rule governments and home rule governments formed after
the effective date of the 1974 constitution, specific constitutional
provisions forbid the exercise of any power or the performance of
any function "denied by general law."'"I
In the past, Louisiana decisions often merged the authority and
prohibition questions." Under the state creature concept, this
merger was understandable because one could infer the lack of
specific authorization from the existence of arguably prohibitory
state statutes. But now that local governments may derive their
authority to act directly from the constitution, sound analysis requires a more complete seperation of the two issues. Unfortunately,
the decision of Rollins Environmental Services of Louisiana, Inc. v.
Iberville Parish Police Jury8 indicates that the supreme court continues to adhere to old approaches notwithstanding the changes in
the 1974 constitution. In Rollins, the court invalidated an Iberville
Parish ordinance that banned the disposal of all hazardous waste
within the parish. The court seemed to offer two alternate grounds
for its decisions: (1) state law did not authorize the Iberville Parish
14. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 7(A).
15. Id. §§ 4, 5(E), 7(A).
16. Id. §§ 5(E), 7(A). The constitution's section on local governments with home
rule charters in existence on the date the constitution was adopted does not contain
the "not denied by" language. It continues the "powers, functions, and duties in effect"
when the constitution was adopted "[e]xcept as inconsistent with this constitution." Id §
4. However, most-probably all-of the pre-1974 home rule charters contain provisions
that forbid the local governments from exercising any power "inconsistent with" a
general state law. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 3(a)(2) (1921, amended 1946) (consolidated government for City of Baton Rouge and East Baton Rouge Parish); id. §
3(c)(3) (1921, amended 1956) (home rule government for Jefferson Parish); id. § 40(c)
(1921, amended 1952) (general authorization for municipalities to adopt home rule
charters).
17. See, e.g., City of Minden v. David Bros. Drug, Co., 195 La. 791, 197 So. 505
(1940).
18. 371 So. 2d 1127 (La. 1979). Justice Tate's concurring opinion points out that
the language of the majority opinion with respect, to the authority issue should be
limited to those local governments without home rule charters whose electorates have
not granted them broader powers. 371 So. 2d at 1134-35.
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Police Jury to regulate hazardous waste, 9 and (2) the ordinance infringed on the spirit of state laws governing hazardous waste disposal
and was thus inconsistent with general state law. 0
Since Iberville Parish did not have a home rule charter, the
authority issue turned on whether state law authorized the parish's
police jury to regulate hazardous waste. The Parish relied on two
subsections of R.S. 33:1236; these two provisions grant police juries
the power to enact ordinances "[t]o protect their respective parishes
against the introduction of every kind of contagious disease"2 and
the power "[t]o enact ordinances to require the destruction, disposal,
or burning of ...debris of any kind ...."22The court held, however,
that neither provision was adequate to justify police jury regulations of hazardous waste. Although conceding that the wording of
the subsections might "arguably be extended by construction to include prohibiting any disposal of hazardous waste within a parish,"
it concluded that "such a construction .. .is not warranted in the
context of those subsections. 22 The court relied on two basic
arguments for its conclusion: the lack of any specific mention of
hazardous waste in either provision2' and the lack of similarity between hazardous waste and items specifically covered in the subsections on which the police jury relied.25
As Mr. Justice Tate's concurring opinion suggests," the potential impact of the ruling on the authority issue is relatively limited.
It would not apply to local governments with a home rule charter,27
and if the local electorate were willing to approve a broader grant of
power, other local governments could avoid the restriction the ruling imposes.28 Nonetheless, the court's holding on this issue seems
unduly restrictive in light of expanded authority that the 1974 constitution grants to local governments. Although a strict construction
of local government power might have been justifiable when the
state creature concept accurately reflected the allocation of power
between the state and its local governments, such an approach
serves no useful function under a system that is willing to grant
local governments broad authority to act so long as the state has
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

371 So. 2d at 1130-31.
Id. at 1131-34.
LA. R.S. 33:1236(16) (1950).
Id.33:1236(31) (Supp. 1966 & 1977) (emphasis added).
371 So. 2d at 1130.
Id.
Id.at 1130-31.
371 So. 2d at 1134.
LA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4, 5(E); see note 13, supra, and accompanying text.
Id.§ 7(A); see note 14, supra, and accompanying text.
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not prohibited a specific action that is challenged. Far more
desirable would be a sympathetic reading of specific grants of power
to enable the local government to exercise all powers it needs to
protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.
More significant is the court's alternate basis of its opinion-that the ordinance was inconsistent with general state law
because it infringed on the spirit of state and federal laws governing
hazardous waste disposal-since this holding apparently would
apply to all local governments." In reaching this determination, the
court specifically relied on the Federal Resources Conservation and
Recovery Act,3" which (according to the court) "regulates the entire
field of 'solid waste' disposal from simple sanitary landfill to industrial waste disposal," 2 as well as state laws granting the Commissioner of Conservation authority to protect fresh water supplies
and to regulate subsurface injections of waste;33 the Department of
Health and Human Resources' "jurisdiction over the handling,
storage and disposal of waste;"3 and the Department of Natural
Resources' "exclusive jurisdiction for the development, implementation, and enforcement of a comprehensive state hazardous waste
29. The argument in the text differs slightly from the claim of the Iberville Parish
police jury that it retained "general powers to protect the health and well-being of its
citizens." 371 So. 2d at 1131. The argument in the text does not posit the existence of
such a residuary power; it merely advocates liberal interpretation of the powers conferred by statute so that parish governing authorities are able to respond to problems
without the necessity of the frequent amendment of R.S. 33:1236 that has been
necessary in the past.
30. Technically, the preemption holding in Rollings found the exercise of the
power by the parish "inconsistent with" general law, 371 So. 2d at 1131, and it did not
discuss whether the state law was sufficiently explicit to satisfy the "denied by
general law" language of the 1974 constitution. But in the only preemption case directly
involving the "not denied by" language of the 1974 constitution, the court ignored the
evidence that the Constitutional Convention intended to distinguish the phrases "consistent with" and "denied by" and treated them as synonomous. City of Shreveport v.
Curry, 357 So. 2d 1078 (La. 1978) (dictum), criticized in Local Government
Law-1977-78 Term, supra note 13, at 857-60.
31. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-87 (1978).
32. 371 So. 2d at 1132. The court noted that the use of the term "solid waste" in
the statute was a misnomer because the statute defined the term to include "solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous materials resulting from industrial, commercial,
mining, and agricultural operations .... " Id., quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1976). In
fact, at the time Rollins was decided, the federal program was not so pervasive as
Chief Justice Summers suggested. See Murchison, Recent Environmental
Developments Affecting Oil and Gas Operations, 26 MIN. L. INST. 54 (1979).
33. 371 So. 2d at 1133, citing 1976 La. Acts, No. 122; 1940 La. Acts, No. 157.
34. 371 So. 2d at 1131.
35. 371 So. 2d at 1133, citing 1978 La. Acts, No. 334, adding LA. R.S. 30:1101-16.
For descriptions of the 1978 statute, see Murchison, supra note 32, at 76; The Work
of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1978 Regular Session-Environmental Law, 39
LA. L. REV. 250-53 (1978).
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control program consistent with federal laws and regulations."35 This
legislation was sufficient, the court declared, to demonstrate "an affirmative and positive preemption by the state and federal governments in the field of hazardous waste regulation." 6
One would find it difficult to quarrel with the preemption
holdings in Rollins if the state and federal laws on which the court
relied supported its conclusion. But the essential weakness of this
portion of the opinion is the failure to examine the content of the
federal and state laws on which the court relies. In fact, although
both the state and the federal government were devising programs
for regulating hazardous waste when Rollins was decided,37 neither
had yet implemented a comprehensive program of hazardous waste
control at that time. While both the court's concern with the
dangers of parochial local regulation38 and its invalidation of the
specific ordinance before it were justifiable,39 the refusal to
countenance any local regulation was ill-advised because it forced all
local governments to wait for state and federal action before attempting reasonable regulation of a singularly significant threat to
the health and safety of the local population. In essence, Rollins
seems to rest on an assumption that the existence of state and
federal laws in an area necessarily manifests an intent to oust local
governments from all regulatory authority in that area, a kind of
preemption by numbers. That assumption is a particularly dubious
one in the environmental field, where state and federal regulations
often reflect a willingness to allow local governments the authority
to go beyond the minimum standards established in state and
federal legislation."
36. 371 So. 2d at 1134.
37. See Murchison, supra note 32, at 79.
38. In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Sanders stated:
It is not difficult to conclude that if Iberville Parish is permitted to prohibit the
disposal of industrial hazardous waste within its borders there will be, in short
order, similar ordinances in every parish of the State. Indeed, several parishes
have enacted such ordinances. Louisiana's prominent position in industry makes it
one of the Nation's foremost producers of chemical and other industrial waste
classified as hazardous. As such it cries out against the prospect of such a stifling
prohibition.
371 So. 2d at 1132.
39. See Murchison, supra note 32, at 79.
40. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 7416 (1977) (Clean Air Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976)
(Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 4905(e)(2) (1976) (Noise Control Act). Cf. 42 U.S.C. §
6929 (1970) (if appliction of federal hazardous waste regulations is enjoined, as to any
matter, "no State or political subdivision shall be prohibited from acting with respect
to the same aspect of such matter until such regulation takes effect") (emphasis added).
Most recent federal statutes have even required the federal government itself to comply
with environmental regulations imposed by state and local government. E.g., 42
U.S.C.A. § 7418 (1977) (Clean Air Act); 33 U.S.C.A. § 1323 (1977) (Clean Water Act); see
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In the final analysis, the legislature probably will resolve the
precise issue involved in Rollins by a procedure that is already being relied on by a number of states: a limited local authority to prohibit disposal of hazardous waste subject to a state agency's authority to override that decision in specific cases.' Unfortunately, the
analytical weakness in the supreme court's approach to that problem
may impose more lasting restrictions on the ability of local governments to deal with environmental and other problems that are valid
matters of local concern.
A second decision tending to restrict the authority of local
governments vis-a-vis the state was West v. Allen.2 In West, the
Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that the state constitution and not
the Jefferson parish home rule charter prescribed the civil service
system applicable to the fire fighters employed by the parish fire
department. Specifically, it held that "the classified civil service
system for firemen and policemen established by .. .the [19741 Constitution . . .is applicable to the parish of Jefferson and the firemen
it employs."'"
Prior to the adoption of the 1974 constitution, Jefferson Parish
operated under a home rule charter that established a civil service
system applicable to all of its employees, including fire fighters and
police officers." The new constitution provided that the charter was
to "remain in effect," and it also allowed the parish to "retain all
powers, functions, and duties in effect" when the constitution was
adopted "[ejxcept as inconsistent with [the] Constitution."4 But article X of the constitution established a special civil service system
for fire fighters and police officers. 4' The section establishing the
system made it applicable to "all parishes ... operating a regularly
paid fire department,"'47 and a separate section in article X provided
generally Murchison, Waivers of Intergovernmental Immunity in Federal EAvironmental Statutes, 62 VA. L. REV. 1177 (1976).
41. See, e.g., Current Developments, 11 ENV. RPT. (BNA) 50 & 244 (Minnesota &
Connecticut) (1980). This approach seems to have found favor with federal officials. 9
id. at 2295 (1979); See also 11 id. at 272 (1980). A 1979 Louisiana statute gives the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources "exclusive jurisdiction" to develop a comprehensive hazardous waste control program for the state, LA. R.S. 30:1134 (Supp.
1979), but also continues a provision prohibiting the state from issuing permits for uses
that would violate local zoning laws. Id. 30:1144 (Supp. 1979).
42. 382 So. 2d 924 (La. 1980).
43. Id. at 926.
44. An amendment to the 1921 Constitution authorized Jefferson Parish to enact
its home rule charter. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 3c (1921, amended 1956). See generally
Letellier v. Jefferson Parish, 254 La. 1067, 229 So. 2d 101 (1969).
45. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
46. LA. CONST. art. X, § 16.
47. LA. CONST. art. X, § 16.
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that "paid firemen in all parishes" were exluded from the general
parish civil service systems. 8
The supreme court ruled that the constitution's provision applied to the fire fighters of Jefferson Parish. Assuming the crucial
issue, the court defined the creating of "a civil service system which
includes . . . firemen and policemen" as a "function of [a] local
government subdivision."'9 It then proceeded to hold the parish provisions invalid on the ground that in view of the numerous differences between the parish system and the fire and police system
of article X, the provisions of the parish home rule charter that
tried to encompass fire fighters within the parish civil service
system were "inconsistent with the 1974 Constitution.""
The court made a difficult problem of interpretation easy by
pretending that it did not exist. The consistency requirement of the
section of the local government article dealing with existing home
rule charters applied only to aspects of the charter that can be
termed "powers, functions, and duties"; otherwise provisions of the
home rule charter "remain in effect.5' Moreover, in construing the
same Jefferson Parish home rule charter involved in West, the
pre-1974 decision of Letellier v. Jefferson Parish2 concluded that
the establishment of a pension plan for fire fighters was neither a
power nor a function but was a matter of "the 'structure and
organization' of the parish government and by the constitutional
allocation fell under the exclusive control of Jefferson Parish.""3 By
failing even to note this decision, the court thus avoided the difficulty (if not the impossibility) of explaining why creating a civil service
system is a "function" but establishing a pension system is not.

LA. CONST. art. X, § 15.
49. 382 So. 2d at 926.
50. Id. The court enumerated the following inconsistencies:
the Jefferson system includes police and firemen in the system with all other
employees, while the Constitution establishes a system of fire and police civil service which applies to towns larger than thirteen thousand and to all parishes with
paid fire departments; the constitutional system covers all towns of a certain size,
and all parishes, while Jefferson Parish seeks to exclude its firemen from the constitutional system; the Constitution authorizes civil service systems for political
subdivisions, specifically excluding from them police and firemen (Article 10, § 19),
while Jefferson includes police and firemen with all other employees in its civil
service system.
51. LA. CONST. art. V1, § 4.
52. 254 La. 1067, 229 So. 2d 101 (1969). See also LaFluer v. City of Baton Rouge,
124 So. 2d 374 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1960). The 1974 Louisiana Constitution forbids the
legislature from enacting laws that interfere with the "structure and organization" of
local governments that have adopted home rule charters. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
53. 254 La. at 1073, 229 So. 2d at 103.
48.
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Despite this analytical weakness in the opinion, the court appears to have reached a correct result in West. It could, however,
have explained its decision more convincingly on either of two
grounds. As one approach, the court could have overruled or,
perhaps, distinguished Letellier, thus producing the inconsistency
that the West opinion assumes. Alternatively, the court could have
accepted Letellier and then resolved the conflicting constitutional
language between the article VI provision that the Jefferson Parish
home rule charter remains in effect and the establishment in article
X of a special civil service system for parish fire fighters. If the
court had faced this conflict directly, for several reasons it should
have reached the same result as the most reasonable construction of
the constitutional document. First, the provisions of article X are
more specific, since they address the particular problem of civil service, while the provisions of article VI address the more general
problem of local government authority and powers. Second, the language of article X is extremely inclusive; both the section establishing the police and fire system and the section prohibiting inclusion of fire fighters within general parish systems apply to "all"
parishes. 4 Third, although the convention debates on article X contain no explicit discussion of the applicability of the police and fire
civil service system to home rule parishes, they do contain considerable discussion, and a special provision, concerning whether the
fire fighters and police officers of New Orleans should be covered by
the special system or remain a part of the city's general civil service
system; 55 this extensive discussion suggests that the convention
knew how to create exceptions to its expansive language when it
wanted to do so. Fourth, the admittedly sketchy convention record
on the point contains at least one indication that the purpose of constitutionalizing the special system for parishes with paid fire departments was to make it applicable to parishes with home rule
charters."
Of course, West adopted neither rationale that would adequately
explain its result, and the reason for ignoring Letellier hardly can
be an oversight, since the prior decision is extensively cited in the
parish's brief. 7 A more likely explanation is that the court continues
to postpone developing an analytical framework for resolving a decision that it must face eventually: defining the extent to which home
rule local governments are protected from state interference in
LA. CONST. art. X, §§ 15, 16.
LA. CONST. art. X, § 1. See 7 RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIN OF 1973: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS 1483-96 (1973).
56. See 9 RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973: COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS 2770-84, 2812-20, 3357 (1973).

54.
55.

57.

Brief for Respondent at 2.
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those purely internal affairs that the 1974 constitution defines as
matters of "structure and organization.""8
Considerably more sympathetic than either Rollins or West to
the needs of local government for adequate authority to deal with
local problems is the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in ACORN
v. City of New Orleans,59 which sustained a $100 "service charge"
that the city levied on each parcel of land listed or assessed on the
city's tax rolls."0 The city acknowledged that the charge imposed
58. See Local Government Law-1977-78 Term, supra note 13, at 853 n.54. For a
brief summary, with excerpts of the convention debates on the point, see K. MUR.
CHISON, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW-SUPPLEMENTARY

CASES & MATERIALS 84-89 (1979).

59. 377 So. 2d 1206 (La. 1979). Chief Justice Summers and Justice Blanche filed
dissenting opinions, and Justice (ad hoc) Landry submitted an opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part. The opinion of the Chief Justice castigated the majority
decision for casting aside "constitutional principle[s] of property taxation as fundamental as any which has guided Louisiana's destiny since 1852," the principles "that
taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the territorial limits of the authority
leveling the tax, and that all property shall be taxed in proportion to its value." 377
So. 2d at 1208 (Summers, C.J., dissenting). He grounded this holding on Article XIV, §
16 of the 1974 Constitution which continues a uniformity requirement as a statute, and
Article VI, § 26(A) which requires that an increase in the millage rate for municipal ad
valorem taxes be approved by the municipality's electorate. The Chief Justice also
argued that the New Orleans levy violated the equal protection guarantees of the
state and federal constitutions; it did not tax the plaintiffs' property "at the percentage of value applicable to others equally and similarly situated." Id. at 1209.
Justice Blanche's brief dissent objected to the New Orleans tax because it circumvented "the concept of 'ad valorem' property taxes to support general revenues"
and thereby denied the electorate of New Orleans the constitutional safeguard of requiring an election before ad valorem taxes could be increased. 377 So. 2d at 1210
(Blanche, J., dissenting). Moreover, he also concluded that the tax denied New Orleans
property owners equal protection of law because of "the inequity, unfairness and
grossly disproportionate differences" it created. Id.
Justice Landry concurred "in the majority holding that the ordinance in question
does not impose an ad valorem tax and that it does not violate the provisons of La.
Const. 1974, Article VI, Section 26(A) and Section 27(A) which limit the levy of ad
valorem taxes." 377 So. 2d at 1210 (Landry, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
But he dissented with respect to the equal protection issue. Although he conceded that
legislatures have "broad discretion" in erecting tax classifications, he nonetheless
found the New Orleans tax invalid because "the tax burden . . . imposed is so utterly
disproportionate as to be completely devoid of a rational basis." Id. at 1210-11.
60. The city's ordinance provided in part:
. . . except as hereinafter provided each owner of real property within the limits
of the City of New Orleans shall pay, and there is hereby levied upon the owner
thereof, an annual special real property service charge of One Hundred ($100.00)
Dollars for each parcel of real property owned by him and separately listed and/or
assessed on the tax rolls of the City of New Orleans for the year 1979 and for
each year thereafter.
377 So. 2d at 1208, quoting New Orleans Ordinance No. 7009, as amended by Ordinance Nos. 7110, 7280, 7286.
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was a tax;"' therefore, the issue for the court was whether New
Orleans constitutionally could impose such a tax. The initial question, the issue of the city's authority to act, presented little difficulty, since the city's charter gives it specific authority to impose "all
kinds and classes of taxes or license fees that are necessary for the
proper operation and maintenance of the municipality" except those
that are "expressly prohibited by the Constitution of the State of
Louisiana."6 Although the court declared that neither party "had
suggested that the tax [levied by the city was] . . . expressly prohibited by the Constitution,"63 it nonetheless considered but rejected
two constitutional objections raised by the plaintiffs: (1) that the tax
conflicted with the property tax provisions of the 1974 constitution;
and (2) that the tax violated the equal protection guarantees of the
state and federal constitutions. 4
The plaintiffs contended that the tax conflicted with the state
constitution's property tax provisions in three respects-because it
was not levied in proportion to the value of the property taxed,
because it increased the amount of tax on assessed valuation of real
property in the city and thereby circumvented the constitution's
limit on the millage rate for municipal ad valorem taxes, and
because it levied a tax that circumvented the homestead exemption
established by the constitution. With respect to the first of these
contentions, the court concluded that the tax was valid even though
it was not proportionate to the value of the property taxed. The
court began its analysis by tracing the development of the restrictions on property taxation that appear in the 1974 constitution. The
six state constitutions enacted between 1845 and 1913 required that
all property taxes be proportionate to the value of the property
taxed,"5 but the 1921 Constitution omitted this requirement and
substituted the more lenient requirement that all taxes "be uniform
upon the same class of subjects throughout the territorial limits of
the authority levying the tax." 6 The 1974 constitution also failed to
61. 377 So. 2d at 1211. Previous decisions left little doubt that, regardless of the
label the city attached to the levy, it was a tax, since it was not "a direct charge for
services rendered." Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Parish of Jefferson, 315 So. 2d 619,
621 (La. 1975).
62. 377 So. 2d at 1212, quoting La. Acts, No. 338, amending New Orleans City
Charter § 1(f). On this basis, the court distinguished Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v.
Parish of Jefferson, 315 So. 2d 619 (La. 1975), in which the parish conceded that it was
not authorized to levy a tax.
63. 377 So. 2d at 1212.
64. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
65. LA. CONST. art. 225 (1913); LA. CONST. art. 225 (1898); LA. CONST. art. 203
(1879); LA. CONST. art. 124 (1864); LA. CONST. art. 123 (1852); LA. CONST. art. 127 (1845).
66. LA. CONST. art. 10, § 1 (1921). Actually, the change first occurred in a 1916
amendment to the 1913 constitution. See 1916 La. Acts, No. 168, amending LA. CONST.
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include a general proportionality requirement, although it continued
the 1921 provision as an ordinary statute"7 (which, according to the
court, the legislature had since repealed).68 Moreover, the new Constitution also established a new provision requiring that the assessment of property subject to ad valorem taxation be uniform
throughout the state. 9 After reviewing the development of these
provisions in considerable detail, the court concluded that the current statutory provision did not invalidate the tax imposed by the
city of New Orleans because it applied only to ad valorem taxes;
that is, taxes imposed "in the form of a percentage on the value of
property."' By contrast, the New Orleans tax was a specific tax,
defined as one "imposed as a fixed sum on each article of a class
without regard to its value.""
The court also rejected two related contentions: (1) that, by increasing the amount of taxes on property subject to ad valorem
taxes, the New Orleans tax circumvented the state constitutional
provisions limiting the authority of municipalities to impose ad
valorem taxes, and (2) that the tax violated the constitution's
homestead exemption provisions. Because both provisions applied
only to ad valorem taxes, the court concluded that neither provision
applied to the specific tax levied by New Orleans. Thus, in view of
the charter provision granting the city authority to levy all taxes
not expressly prohibited by the state constitution, the court held
that the restrictions on the authority of local governments to impose
ad valorem taxes on property did not limit the city's authority to
art. 225 (1913). Since the 1921 constitution merely continued pre-existing law (that is,
the 1916 amendment to the 1913 constitution), one should not find it surprising that, as
the court noted, the 1921 provision attracted little contemporary attention. 337 So. 2d
at 1213. One possible reason for the 1916 change may have been to permit assessment
and tax rates for different classes of property, but research into the debate surrounding the 1916 amendment would be necessary to confirm or refute this hypothesis.
67. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 16.
68. 337 So. 2d at 1213, citing 1978 La. Acts, No. 613, § 1; 1975 Acts, No. 170, § 1.
The majority seems to have erred on this point. The 1975 statute cited by the court
amended and incorporated into the Revised Statutes as section 1958.1 of Title 47 only
those portions of article 10 of the 1921 constitution that dealt with timber and forest
lands; it did not mention the uniformity requirement of that section. As a result, the
1978 statute, which repealed section 1958.1, would appear to leave the uniformity requirement unaffected.
This factual error does not affect the soundness of the court's basic analysis,
however. As noted above, the requirement that property be taxed in proportion in accordance with its value had been eliminated in the 1916 amendment to the 1913 constitution, see note 67, supra; and thus, the 1921 provision, which was continued as a
statute by the 1974 constitution, does not contain a proportionality requirement.
69. LA. CONST. art. 7, § 18(D).
70. 377 So. 2d at 1213.
71.

Id.
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impose a specific tax on that property. Similarly, the court ruled
that the constitution's provision exempting homesteads from certain
ad valorem taxes"2 did not immunize that class of property from
other taxes that the city was authorized to impose.
The court's discussion of the equal protection challenge to the
New Orleans tax addressed two distinct subissues: (1) the general
appropriateness of the statutory classification whereby the applicability of the tax was limited to parcels of property separately
listed or assessed on the city's tax rolls, and (2) the ability of the
city to impose a tax on real property that failed to distinguish between parcels of widely differing values. The first of these
issues-the general appropriateness of using the assessor's tax rolls
as the basis for a tax classification-gave the court little difficulty.
Since the challenged classification neither singled out a suspect class
of persons for unfavorable treatment nor infringed on the exercise
of a fundamental constitutional right, the court required only that
"the classification created by the legislature [bear] a rational relationship to legitimate state purposes"73 and imposed on the ACORN
plaintiffs the burden of demonstrating the lack of a legitimate state
purpose. 4 Applying this deferential approach to the specific case
before it, the court rejected the equal protection challenge to the
New Orleans tax because the plaintiffs had failed to carry "their
burden of negativing every conceivable basis which might support
the City's decision to distinguish between parcels of real property
and entities which are not parcels of real property, as a basis for
allocating the burden of this tax."75
72. LA. CONST. art. 7, § 20. The homestead exemption does not apply to municipal
taxes imposed by municipalities other than the city of New Orleans. LA. CONST. art. 7,
§ 20(W).
73. 377 So. 2d at 1214. By failing to distinguish between the federal and state
equal protection requirements, the court suggested sub silentio that the two were
identical, of course. Accord, Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 366 So. 2d
1381 (La. 1978). State courts are free to define state guarantees more broadly than the
Supreme Court's definition of federal guarantees, even when the wording of state and
federal rights is identical, see Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035
(1980); see generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); and the Louisiana Supreme Court has occasionally
invalidated statutes on state constitutional grounds without considering the applicability of the federal provisions. E.g., Succession of Thompson, 367 So. 2d 796 (La. 1979).
74. 377 So. 2d at 1215.
75. Id. The court suggested one rationale the legislature might have accepted:
It is conceivable that the city might have determined, in attempting to provide a
source of additional revenues to meet the ever-increasing demands upon its services to all its citizens, that parcels of real property are particularly easy to identify because of their current presence on the tax rolls, and that the ownership of
such parcels is indicative both of some financial stability and of a long term
dependency upon those city services which provide a benefit to the owners.
Id. at 1215-16.
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The second equal protection argument advanced by the plaintiffs
was unusual in that it challenged not a legislative discrimination but
the failure of the tax to distinguish between the various types of
real property listed or assessed on the city's tax rolls. The plaintiffs
objected to this failure to discriminate because it caused the tax to
have different impacts on different types of property owners; as a
result, "the owner of a small residence, of little market value, carries a relatively greater burden with regard to the totality of his
assets than does the owner of a large, heavily exploited and highly
valued commercial or rental property." 6 In analyzing this issue, the
court apparently assumed that the differential impact of the failure
to draw distinctions in the statute could amount to a violation of
equal protection (although it never stated that assumption
explicitly), but the court clearly indicated that such claims would
receive only a minimal scrutiny." After quoting extensively from
several recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court that
upheld various state and federal laws against equal protection
challenges,"8 the Louisiana court sustained the New Orleans tax on
the ground that it "creates a class of parcels of real estate which
has a rational relationship to a legitimate government revenue raising purpose"" and treates all parcels within the class equally.
Although the court recognized that the tax might have "a disproportionately greater impact upon property owners with fewer financial
resources,"8 it refused to hold that this disproportionate impact
76. Id. at 1216.
77. Id. The court began by noting two considerations that guided this portion of
its analysis of the equal protection issues. First, it refused "to demand that the tax
must differentially reflect differences in value" because that requirement would "insist
that the tax be what it is not;" that is, an ad valorem rather than a specific tax. Second, it declared erroneous the assumption "that the reasonableness of a classification
depends on whether the class is 'natural' or 'unnatural' and 'artificial."' Since "[alli
legislative classifications are artificial in the sense that they are artifacts, no matter
what the defining trait may be," the court indicated that the proper test was whether
the classification "is one which includes all persons who are similarly situated with
respect to the purpose of the law." IL, quoting Tussman and Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 348 (1949). The court then continued with the
following observation regarding the classification scheme employed in the New Orleans
tax.
If the purpose of the ordinance is to provide revenues for the city by taxing readily
identifiable units, all parcels of real property separately listed and/or assessed on
the city's tax rolls are similarly situated with respect to this purpose.
377 So. 2d at 1216.
78. 377 So. 2d at 1216-17, quoting Personnel Administration v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 271-72 (1979); New York Transit Authority v. Beazor, 440 U.S. 568, 593 (1979);
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485
(1970); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973).
79. 377 So. 2d at 1218.
80. Id.
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amounted to a denial of equal protection. To remedy any inequity in
the tax, the court declared, the citizens of New Orleans had to rely
on "the elective and legislative process."81
The court's decision in ACORN merits commendation for its
refusal to imply stringent constitutional limits on the ability of the
state's largest city to deal with its pressing financial problems, but
the practical application of the decision for other Louisiana local
governments is likely to be limited. The constitution grants general
taxing power to local governments only "under authority granted by
the legislature,"82 and in the past the court has declined to imply a
legislative grant of authority of taxing power even as to local
governments with home rule charters.83 The widespread oposition to
new taxes that characterizes contemporary American life makes it
unlikely that the legislature will grant or that other local governments will chose to exercise such authority in the near future.
Nonetheless, ACORN does offer a legal option that may prove
politically feasible for some local governments in the more distant
future.
In formulating the basic rationale for the refusal to invalidate
the New Orleans tax, ACORN properly relied on a sound analytical
distinction-the difference between ad valorem and specific taxes.
The difference is a long-established one;84 and since the 1974 constitution manifests no clear intention to forbid specific taxes, it
seems logical to refuse to apply limitations on ad valorem taxes that
would, as a practical matter, eliminate the ability to impose specific
taxes. This reasoning is particularly persuasive with regard to the
uniformity requirement on which the plaintiffs placed their greatest
reliance. The only uniformity requirement in the 1974 constitution is
the section requiring uniform assessments of property subject to
taxation, and the aim of that requirement was to preclude taxpayers
in different parishes from bearing unequal burdens of state ad
valorem taxes,85 not to limit the ability of individual local governments to tax their own citizens.
As a practical matter, the plaintiffs' equal protection challenge
81. Id.
82. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 30.
83. See Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Parish of Jefferson, 315 So. 2d 619, 621 (La.
1975).
84. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 51 (3d ed. 1933) (definition of ad valorem).
85. For decisions, first unsuccessfully but later successfully, attacking the unequal
assessment practices prior to the 1974 constitution, see Dixon v. Flournoy, 247 La.
1067, 176 So. 2d 138 (1965), and Bussie v. Long, 286 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 288 So. 2d 354 (La. 1974). The legislature repealed the statewide property
tax in 1972, and it has not been reinstituted. LA. CONST. art. 10-A, § 1 (1921).
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sought to establish, as equal protection doctrine, the very proportionality requirement that Louisiana had eliminated from its state
constitution, and the court's deferential approach to both prongs of
that challenge merits approval. When a statute neither singles out a
politically vulnerable group nor significantly burdens the exercise of
the constitutional rights of individuals, American courts generally
have afforded the legislature wide latitude, and this deference
seems justified in a democratic society where issues of public policy
are most appropriately decided via the electoral process. Indeed,
this deference is particularly defensible with respect to taxes,
because one normally is looking at only one aspect of a total scheme
of taxation. Thus, for example, the obvious disproportionate impact
of the New Orleans levy seems less onerous when viewed in light of
the total tax burden that New Orleans property owners are forced
to bear. Not only are private residences assessed at a lower rate
than most business and commercial properties," but the dwellings in
New Orleans are exempt from ad valorem taxes on the first $50,000
of property value,87 an immunity worth up to $350 for the individual
property owners.8 In light of this exemption, the New Orleans levy
requiring all property owners to pay a minimum tax of $100 seems
more reasonable. Although this particular tax falls more heavily on
residential property owners, it was not necessarily an unreasonable
burden, since business and commercial property with higher assessment rates and no homestead exemption bears a disproportionate
percentage of the ad valorem tax burden.
The decisions reached in Rollins, West, and ACORN are basically reasonable, but the opinions-considered as a group-reflect
86. Originally, the constitution established the following assessment rates for
various classes of property
1. Land- 10%
2. Improvements for residential purposes - 10%
3. Other property-15%
LA. CONST. art. 7, § 18(B) (emphasis added). A 1979 amendment, however, added a new
class for "public service properties." See 1979 La. Acts, No. 799, § 1.
87. LA. CONST. art. 7, §§ 18(B), 20(A)(5); LA. R.S. 47:1703(A) (Supp. 1976). The exemption, as extended by statute, now covers taxes on the first $5,000 of assessed
value, and the constitution requires that residential property be assessed at ten percent of its fair market value. Thus, a home worth $50,000 would be assessed at $5,000
and be totally exempted from state and parish ad valorem taxes. The homestead exemption does not apply to municipal ad valorem taxes except for those imposed by the
city of New Orleans, thus suggesting an additional justification for New Orleans to impose a minimum tax applicable to all property owners.
88. This dollar figure assumes that the property's value is at least $50,000, the
assessment rate is ten percent, and the tax rate is the constitutional maximum of
seven mills. If a homestead is worth less than $50,000, the property owner pays no ad
valorem tax.
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the continued failure of the Louisiana Supreme Court to articulate a
coherent framework for analyzing problems involving the authority
of local governments. As a result, predictions as to future decisions
concerning the extent of local government power remain speculative
at best. This uncertainity is particularly regrettable because it is unneccessary. As indicated above," the 1974 constitution articulates
general principles that invite the development of a general theory of
local government authority. Unfortunately, the court has not yet accepted that invitation.
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
Discharges Because of PoliticalAffiliation
Four years ago the United States Supreme Court first established a constitutional limitation to the patronage system for filling
public jobs. In Elrod v. Burns,0 the Court held that the first amendment rights of employees who were not protected by civil service
laws precluded the sheriff for whom they worked from discharging
them solely "because they did not support and were not members of
[the sheriff's political party] and had failed to obtain the sponsorship
of one of its leaders."'" The exact reach of Elrod remained uncertain,
however, because the Court failed to produce a majority opinion explaining the precise nature of the new constitutional limit on governmental power. Writing for three members of the five-member majority, Mr. Justice Brennan argued that "[limiting patronage
dismissals to policymaking positions" was adequate to protect the
only valid governmental interest served by patronage, that of
preventing representative government from being "undercut by tactics obstructing the implementation of policies of the new administration, policies presumably sanctioned by the electorate."92 On
the other hand, Mr. Justice Stewart, whose concurring opinion Mr.
Justice Blackmun joined, adopted a test that seemed to leave more
room for political patronage; he argued that the new protection
should be extended only to "nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential
government employee[s," 93 although he concluded that the particular employees involved in Elrod-three employees of the process
division and a bailiff and a security guard for the juvenile
court-were entitled to protection even under his test.
89. See notes 11-16, supra, and accompanying text.
90. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). See Note, Elrod v. Burns: ConstitutionalJob Security for
Public Employees?, 37 LA. L. REV. 990 (1977).

91.

427 U.S. at 351.

92.
93.

Id. at 367.
427 U.S. at 375 (Stewart, J.,concurring) (emphasis added).
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During the 1979-80 term, the Court largely eliminated the
possibility that Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion would form
the basis for a narrow reading of Elrod. In Branti v. Finkel," a majority of the Court rejected arguments trying to curb the substantive reach of the first amendment rights on which Elrod was based
as well as to restrict the class of public employees protected by the
decision; specifically, Branti held that assistant public defenders fall
within the protection of the Elrod rule and cannot be dismissed
merey because they lack sponsors in the political party that controls
the county legislature.
In trying to limit the substantive principles of Elrod, the plaintiffs in Branti argued that Elrod should be applied only to the types
of express political coercion involved in the earlier case, that is, asking an employee "to change his political affiliation or to contribute
to or work for the party's candidate.""5 The Court refused to adopt
this narrow approach to Elrod because it would "emasculate the
principles" of the earlier decision." Although the restrictive approach would "perhaps eliminate the more blatant forms of coercion
described in Elrod," it would permit "the coercion of belief that
necessarily flows from the knowledge that one must have a sponsor
in the dominant party in order to retain one's job."97 According to
Mr. Justice Steven's majority opinion, the Elrod principle was considerably broader; it prohibited all discharges based "solely" on the
employee's lack of affiliation with, or sponsorship by, a particular
party.
94. 100 S. Ct. 1287 (1980). Mr. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion relying on
his Elrod concurrence, which limited the constitutional protection to nonpolicy making,
nonconfidential government employees. Under this view, Elrod was not controlling
"for the simple reason that the respondents here clearly are not 'nonconfidential'
employees." 100 S. Ct. at 1296 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Thus, he argued, the public
defender "was not constitutionally compelled to enter such a close professional and
necessarily confidential association with the [plaintiffs] if he did not wish to do so." Id.
Mr. Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion that Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined and Mr.
Justice Stewart joined in part. He objected to the "vague and sweeping language" of
the majority opinion which, he asserted, was "certain to create vast uncertainty" for
"[ellected and appointed officials at all levels who now receive guidance from civil service laws." 100 S. Ct. at 1297 (Powell, J., dissenting). Even "more fundamentally," he
contended that the court erred "in its conclusion that the First Amendment prohibits
the use of membership in a national political party as a criterion for the dismissal of
public employees," id. at 1298, an error that stemmed from the failure to recognize the
valid governmental interests served by the patronage system. Id. at 1299-1302. Finally,
he criticized the court's decision as "anti-democratic because it limitled] the ability of
the voters of a county to structure their democratic government in the way that they
please." Id. at 1302.
95. 100 S. Ct. at 1293.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1293-94.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

The majority also rejected the alternative argument that assistant public defenders do not fall within the class of persons protected by Elrod. Conceding "that party affiliation may be an acceptable requirement for some types of government employment" and
that "it is not always easy to determine whether a position is one in
which political affiliation is a legitimate factor to be considered,"98
Mr. Justice Stevens nonetheless narrowly defined the reach of this
exception to Elrod. Abandoning the "policymaking" and "confidential" labels of the Elrod opinions, he redefined the "ultimate
inquiry" as "whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that
party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved."99 When this standard was used, the majority termed it "manifest that the continued employment
of an assistant public defender cannot properly be conditioned upon
his allegiance to the political party in control of the county govern1
ment.""
' Since "the primary, if not the only responsibility" of such
an attorney "is to represent individual citizens in controversy with
the state," all the "policymaking [that] occurs in the public
defender's office must relate to the needs of individual clients and
not to any partisan political interests," and any confidential information that comes to the attorney out of the attorney-client relationship "has no bearing whatsoever on partisan political concerns......
Thus, the Court concluded that making an assistant public
defender's tenure depend on his allegiance to the dominant political
party "would undermine, rather than promote, the effective performance" of the office.02
The overall impact of Elrod and Branti on local governmental
employees in Louisiana is likely to be rather slight. Most employees
are already covered by civil service laws that preclude dismissals
based on political affiliation,0 3 although some persons exempted
from the classified service in Louisiana may still be entitled to constitutional protection. One significant exception to the general rule
of civil service coverage does exist, however. Neither state nor local
98. Id. at 1294.
99. Id. at 1295.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g. LA. CONST. art. X, § 1 (creation of civil service systems for the state
and the city of New Orleans); § 14 (authority for parishes and cities with population
over 10,000 to join state system); § 15 (authority for the creation of city and parish
civil service systems); § 16 (creation of fire and police civil service system); LA. R.S.
33:711 (1950) (civil service system for cities with commission and city manager form of
government); LA. R.S. 33:2391-2433 (1950 & Supp. 1979) (creation of civil service
system for cities with a population in excess of 100,000).
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civil service laws °4 cover persons employed by the various elected
state officials who serve at the parochial level-sheriffs, 5 district
attorneys,"6 clerks of court, 7 coroners,' 8 and assessors;' 9 and those
employees traditionally have served at the discretion of the individual officer for whom they work,"0 a euphemistic way of saying
that the positions could be used as instruments of political
patronage. Under Elrod and Branti, most of these employees should
now receive a limited constitutional protection that forbids making
political affiliation a condition of employment."' Of course, claiming
the protection may be difficult as a practical matter because the
employee bears the substantial burden of proving that he was
discharge "solely" because of his political beliefs."2 Nonetheless, the
Elrod-Branti doctrine may well proscribe the most blatant forms of
patronage practices, especially since the plaintiffs in such cases may
seek damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."'
Some employees might still have a sufficiently close relationship to the elected officials to fall within the Branti exception per104. LA. CONST. art. X, § 2(B)(10) (exemption of employees of state officers discussed
in text from classified civil service).
105. LA. CONST. art. V, § 27. The supreme court has recently attempted to define
the status of the sheriffs office. See Foster v. Hampton, 352 So. 2d 197 (1977). See
generally Local Government Law-1977-78 Term, supra note 13, at 871-79.
106. LA. CONST. art. V, § 26.
107. LA. CONST. art. V, § 28.
108. LA. CONST. art. V, § 29.
109. LA. R.S. 47:1901 (Supp. 1970).
110. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 16:51 (Supp. 1974) (assistant district attorneys); LA. R.S.
33:1552 (Supp. 1952); 1928-30 Op. La. Atty. Gen. 88 (deputy coroners); Boyer v. St.
Amant, 364 So. 2d 1338, 1340 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 1108 (La.
1978) (deputy sheriffs).
111. Both Elrod and Branti were concerned with a requirement of support by a formally organized political party. However, the rationale on which they rest does not appear to be limited to formal party structures and would seem to preclude a dismissal
based on a lack of support within a particular party faction or, indeed, any dismissal
based on political affiliation.
112. 100 S. Ct. at 1294. See Note, supra note 90, at 999.
113. See notes 141-95, infra, and accompanying text. The status of these officers
under state law as "state officers" who are not subject to the control of any local
government may raise serious difficulties for the plaintiff in a suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Although cities and other local governments are amenable to suit under section
1983, Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the office
of the various state officers is not a local government under Louisiana law. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grant Parish Sheriffs Dep't., 350 So. 2d 236, 238-39 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 235 (1977). Since the eleventh amendment precludes a section
1983 action against the state, the plaintiff would be relegated to an individual action
against the officer who fired him, and the officer would presumably be entitled to the
good-faith immunity under the statute that the Supreme Court has recognized in a
variety of contexts. See note 145, infra.
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mitting patronage appointments for positions in which political affiliation "is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.'. 14 The reach of this exception
remains vague, but the examples in Branti's majority opinion indicate that, at a minimum, it covers certain personal assistants of at
least some elected public officials." 5 Thus patronage still may be an
acceptable basis for hiring persons who handle matters such as
public relations or relations with other governmental officials and
bodies, but the exact delineation of this class will have to await
future litigation.
Perhaps the most difficult general application of Branti in Louisiana will involve assistant district attorneys."' On the one hand, the
analogy to the assistant pubic defenders in Branti (that is, the
responsibilities of an assistant public prosecutor are similar to those
of an assistant public defender) is a strong one. But one can articulate a distinguishing argument: assistant prosecutors may be involved in policy decisions that, unlike those of defense counsel, concern matters such as the allocation of limited resources, the anticipated deterrent impact of a prosecution, and the overall
seriousness of the offense, that go beyond the interests of the persons directly affected by the particular prosecution. In support of
this argument, one can cite the consistent practice of the federal
government with respect to its prosecutors as a compelling
analogy." 7
Apart from the uncertain reach of the Branti exception, the
Court's specific decision in the case before it is also questionable. As
Mr. Justice Powell persuasively argues in dissent, the underlying
assumption of Elrod and Branti-that a patronage system for
allocating public offices does not serve the cause of democracy-is a
highly debatable one that many of the strongest American advocates of democracy in the nineteenth century would have denied;" 8
thus, it provides a weak foundation for the constitutional doctrine
that is being erected upon it. Moreover, the precise issue involved in
Branti, whether the nature of the relationship between a public
defender and his assistants is strengthened by a requirement that
all of the attorneys have similar political affiliations, is itself a more
114. 110 S. Ct. at 1295.
115. Id. The Court indicated the exception would apply to those assistants of a
governor "who help him write speeches, explain his views to the press, or communicate with the legislature ... "
116. Under Louisiana law, district attorneys appoint their assistants, who serve at
their pleasure. LA. R.S. 16:51 (Supp. 1974).
117. See 100 S. Ct. at 1298 (Powell, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1296-97.
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difficult problem than the Court's opinion would suggest. By focusing exclusively on the individual attorney's duty to his clients,"9 the
Court ignores the possibility that the professional members in the
office may well be called upon to play a broader role (perhaps, for
example, with speeches to the public) with respect to issues that
concern the function or the political status of the office. Not only
does the vision, expressed in Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent,' of the
public defender's office as a public equivalent of the private law firm
seem more realistic, but it also offers a more professional role for
the attorneys who serve in the office. And if that vision of the
public defender's office is a valid one, surely Mr. Justice Stewart is
right when he argues that one can identify "few occupational relationships more instinct with the necessity of mutual confidence and
trust than that kind of professional association.''.
Strikes by Public Employees
Labor disputes between public employees and the local governments for which they work have become a common feature of American life, and dissatisfied employees, in Louisiana and elsewhere,
have increasingly resorted to strikes as one method of obtaining
satisfactory responses from their employers. The best-known example of this trend in Louisiana was the New Orleans police strike in
1979. In addition to forcing the cancellation of most Mardi Gras
festivities for the year, it also required Louisiana courts to take
some preliminary steps toward defining the legal consequences of
such a work stoppage in this state.
As one method of exerting pressure on the police union to end
the strike, the city initiated a legal action seeking a declaration that
the strike was illegal and an injunction prohibiting the strike. The
civil district court granted the injunction, and the fourth circuit affirmed that decision in City of New Orleans v. Police Association of
Louisiana (PoliceAssociation I).2 The appellate court began its opinion by noting that "every state that has considered the question
has decided that, in the absence of a statute governing public
employee strikes, public employees have no right to strike or
119. Id. at 1295.
120. 100 S. Ct. at 1296 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. 369 So. 2d 188 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 So. 2d 1269 (La. 1979). The
injunction ordered the union and its officers to direct the members to return to work
and ordered the members to stop strikipg. It did not, however, order any individual
police officer to return to work, presumably because no officer had a duty to accept
employment with the city. 369 So. 2d at 190 n.3.
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engage in work stoppages,"'23 but it ultimately chose to rest its
holding on the narrower ground that "a strike by police officers
must be prohibited" because it "not only leaves society defenseless
against crime but even inspires lawlessness."'2 4 The court carefully
distinguished the impact of a police strike from that of a strike in
the private sector; it insisted that while "[sitriking employees of a
private business can bring their employer to his knees without endangering the public health and safety," a police strike "takes law
enforcement and consequently the rule of law itself from our
society."' 25 Although the court acknowledged that police officers, like
other government employees, are guaranteed rights of speech, assembly, and petition,' 6 it concluded that enjoining a strike does not
deprive police officers of any of those rights. The court recognized
that depriving police unions of the right to strike, "the employees'
ultimate weapon in collective negotiations," placed them at a disadvantage in collective bargaining, but it nonetheless held that police
strikes must be held illegal because of "the overriding concern for
public safety, health and welfare."' 27
The city subsequently sought a contempt order punishing the
union for its failure to obey the injunction ordered in Police Association 128 The civil district court found the union guilty of contempt
and fined the union $600,000. In City of New Orleans v. Police
Association of Louisiana (Police Association II,"2' the fourth circuit
affirmed the finding of guilty but reduced the fine to $500. The
fourth circuit reduced the fine notwithstanding its declaration that
"the actions of the union, even measured in dollars alone, caused
123. 369 So. 2d at 188, citing Annot., LABOR LAw: RIGHT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES TO
STRIKE OR ENGAGE IN WORK STOPPAGE, 37 A.L.R.3d 1147, 1156-57 (1971).
124. 369 So. 2d at 189.
125. Id. The court conceded that its rationale would not apply to all government
employees: "In respect to their threat to society's existance, for example, the difference between strikes by police and by museum employees is obvious. Society can
tolerate the temporary closing of a museum, but not the suspension of law." Id. at
189-90.
126. See Tassin v. Nat. Union of Police Officers, 311 So. 2d 591 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1975). See also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F.
Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969). See generally Comment, Public Employee Collective
Bargaining in Louisiana, 34 LA. L. REV. 57 (1973).
127. 369 So. 2d at 190.
128. Originally, the city sought contempt citations against the union's officers and
directors as well as against various other individual police officers. The charges
against all of the individuals except the officers and directors were dismissed at the request of the city, and the civil district court granted a motion to quash the charges
against the officers and directors. City of New Orleans v. Police Ass'n of La., 371 So.
2d 638, 639 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 658 (La. 1979).
129. 371 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. dented, 374 So. 2d 658 (La. 1979).
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losses far in excess of the amount of the fine" and its belief "that a
materially smaller fine would most certainly be no deterrent to
future actions by organizations or associations which illegally choose
to disregard court orders." 3 ' According to the court of appeals, the
only statutes granting the trial court authority to punish the union
permitted a maximum fine of $500 to be imposed on "a person adjudged guilty of contempt of court." '' It specifically rejected the
trial court's method of using the $500 figure to establish the
$600,000 fine "by multiplying $500 by 1200, the latter figure being
his estimate of the numbers of union members who jointly and in
their collective capacities had violated the ...injunction."'3 2 Since
an unincorporated association can be sued in Louisiana'33 and the
contempt charges against individual union members previously had
been dismissed,' the union remained as the only defendant and
was, therefore, "the 'person' referred to in [the statute].""'3 Thus, the
district court was bound by the $500 maximum "[rlegardless of how
small the maximum amount of the fine permitted by that article and
that statute may be by comparision to what would be a more appropriate amount in light of the contempt committed here .... .36
Both decisions of the court of appeal appear correct. A concerted refusal of public employees to provide essential governmental
services"' attacks the very basis of civilized society, especially in
urban areas. Thus, it seems reasonable to declare, as the court did
in Police Association I, that such strikes are unlawful in the absence
of legislation permitting them. But the court also wisely refused, in
Police Association H, to rely on the lack of an adequate judicial
remedy as the basis for an expansive interpretation of the punishment provided for contempt of court. The exercise of the court's
contempt power involves summary proceedings that lack some of
the protections normally afforded to lawbreakers in criminal pro-

130. Id. at 640.
131. Id., quoting LA. R.S. 13:4611(A)(2) (Supp. 1972). In its opinion on rehearing, the
court, relying on section 2 of Article V of the Louisiana Constitution, rejected the concept that courts have an inherent contempt power that the legislature cannot regulate.
371 So. 2d at 641.
132. 371 So. 2d at 640.
133. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 689 & 738.
134. See note 128, supra.
135. 371 So. 2d at 641.
136. Id.
137. This argument would not necessarily preclude strikes by all public employees
since not all services provided by local governments are equally essential to functioning social order. Accord, 369 So. 2d at 189-90. It would apply to such basic services as
those provided by police, fire, and sanitation departments.
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ceedings.11 Thus, although expansion of this power might at first
seem a desirable way of overcoming the legislative neglect to provide adequately for strikes in the public sector, such an expansion
would conflict with a considered legislative decision to confine
within narrow boundaries a power with considerable potential for
abuse.
Considered together, the two New Orleans cases reflect the
limited role that the judiciary can play in solving labor disputes in
the public sector. The form of injunctive relief available, 39 the
limited punishment provided for contempt, and the reluctance to
punish individual employees once they have returned to work
operate, as a practical matter, to limit the role of the courts. More
fundamentally, the lack of adequate remedies reflects the inability of
the political system of contemporary America to reach a consensus
as to a means for resolving these impasses. Indeed, the legal proceedings were relatively unimportant in the ultimate failure of the
New Orleans strike to achieve its goal. Basically, that failure stemmed from the governor's willingness to use state authority, in the
form of the state police and the national guard, to maintain a
minimum level of public order during the strike. Moreover, since the
legislature has remained unwilling or unable to formulate a general
procedure for resolving the labor disputes that are virtually certain
to plague the public sector in the future,' 0 the willingness of the
state's chief executive to use state resources to back local government employers is likely to continue to be the decisive factor in
determining whether those employers will prevail when all attempts
at local compromise fail.

138. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 225. The comments of the revising commission make
explicit the intention to deny a trial by jury to the person charged with contempt. LA.
CODE Civ. P. art. 225, Comment (b).
139. See note 128, supra.
140. In fairness to the legislature, one should note that no state has yet devised a
completely satisfactory system for handling labor disputes in the public sector. Elected
officials of local governments generally object to binding arbitration because it invades
their perogatives as the elected representatives of the people and thus impairs the
democratic process. A second proposal has been to impose various penalties on the
strikers (either individually or through their union), but these laws generally have proven to have limited value because of the government's desire to avoid the continuing
ill feeling that post-strike punishment engenders. One self-enforcing mechanism that
has not been tried is the creation of a tort remedy to individual members of the community who are harmed by the strike, thus permitting local businesses to recover
damages. Probably because it cannot be controlled by the political process (that is, the
local government could not force the businesses to abandon their legal actions as part
of a strike settlement), it has not yet been a politically viable option in any state.
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TORT LIABILITY

Civil Rights Violations
As recently as 1978, lawsuits based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of civil rights presented relatively few problems for
local governments exercising general governmental powers."'
Monroe v. Pape"' held that the federal statute did not apply to
municipalities, thus totally immunizing them from suit; and subsequent decisions afforded comparable immunity to counties. "3
Moreover, although local officials acting "under color of law" could
be held personally liable in section 1983 actions,"' the United States
Supreme Court had, in a variety of contexts, recognized an imthat protected officials so long as they acted in
munity doctrine
15
good faith.

The erosion of the protection afforded local governments began
two years ago with Monell v. New York City Department of Social
Services,"' which overruled Monroe and held that local governments
were "persons" covered by the statute. AlthoughMonell stopped
short of imposing vicarious liability on local governments for all constitutional violations committed by their employees,"' it did hold that
141. Numerous decisions had assumed, without explicitly considering the issue,
that school boards were covered by the statute. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See generally
Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978);
436 U.S. at 710-11 (Powell, J., concurring).
142. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
143. E.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961).
144. E.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411
U.S. 693 (1973). None of the challenges in these cases expressly sought a reversal of
Monroe. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. at 710 &
710 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court also recognized an analogous, non-statutory cause of action
against federal officials who violated the constitutional rights of citizens. See Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
145. E.g. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (prison officials); O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (superintendent of state hospital); Wood v. Strickland
420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)
(state executive officers performing discretionary acts during the course of their
employment). For prosecutors when they were presenting the state's case, for judges,
for legislators the Court recognized an absolute immunity. See Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367 (1951).
146. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
147. Id. at 691.
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a local government would be liable when the violation occurred as the
result of an established governmental policy. " In abolishing the absolute immunity rule of Monroe, the Monell decision left open the
possibility that governments might be entitled to a good-faith immunity analogous to that granted to employees;" 9 but the recent decision
in Owen v. City of Independence"' eliminated that possibility by
holding that a local government is always liable for the damage
resulting from its unconstitutional policies.
Emphasizing that "the question ofthe scope of a municipality's
immunity under §1983 is essentially one of statutory construction,"'.. Mr. Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Owen gave
several reasons for rejecting good-faith immunity as a matter of
statutory construction: (1) "the language of the statute itself,"
language that, he argued, created 'a species of tort liability that on
148. Id.
149. Id. at 701.
150. 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980). Mr. Justice Powell dissented in an opinion that the
Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined. 100 S. Ct. at 1419-32 (Powell,
J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the majority had erred both in its determination that the city had violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights and its refusal to
recognize a good-faith immunity for local governments.
According to Mr. Justice Powell, "[clareful analysis of the record supports the
District Court's view that [the plaintiff] suffered no constitutional deprivation," id. at
1419, because "nothing in [his] actual firing cast such a stigma on [the plaintiffs] professional reputation that his liberty was infringed." Id. at 1421. The only arguably
stigmatising comments were made by an individual councilman, but those statements
"provide[d] no basis for.this action against the city" since MonelU precluded imposing
liability "on a theory of respondeat superior." Id. at 1422.
With respect to the majority's refusal to recognize the good-faith immunity, Mr.
Justice Powell argued that the majority conclusion that the Congress that adopted the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 "silently rejected common-law municipal immunity" was inconsistent with its previous refusals to find a silent abrogation of executive immunities.
Id. at 1424. Moreover, it conflicted with several "[ilmportant public policies" including
the separation of powers notion that "some governmental decisions should be at least
presumptively insulated from judicial review," id.; "basic fairness," which includes "the
idea that liability should not attach unless there was notice that constitutional right
was at risk," id. at 1425; and the reality "than many local governments lack the
resources to withstand substantial unanticipated liability under § 1983;" Id. The dissent declared that the majority opinion searched "at length-and in vain-for legal
authority to buttress its policy judgment." Id. at 1426. It particularly disputed, in a
length discussion of the significance of the legislative history, the suggestion that the
majority could find any "support for its position in the debates on the civil rights
legislation that included § 1983," id., and emphasized that the court's decision ran
"counter to the common law in the 19th century, which recognized substantial tort
immunity for municipal actions." Id. at 1428. Finally, Mr. Justice Powell questioned the
majority's approach because it "conflict[ed] with the current law in 44 States and the
District of Columbia," all of which "provide municipal immunity at least analogous to a
'good faith' defense against liability for constitutional torts." Id. at 1430.
151. 100 S. Ct. at 1407.
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its face admits of no immunities,' ' 52 (2) the congressional debates,
which confirmed "the expansive sweep of the statutory language"; 53
(3) the absence of any "tradition of immunity . . . so firmly rooted in
the common law and . . . supported by such strong policy reasons
that 'Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to
abolish the doctrine'; 54 and (4) the increased acceptance of
"equitable loss-spreading" as a principle of tort law.'
A significant portion of the majority opinion is devoted to
refuting the suggestion that any tradition of municipal tort immunity justified a good-faith immunity for municipalities under section 1983. Basically, the Court's survey of nineteenth century decisions convinced it that the question "of a qualified immunity based
on the good faith of municipal officers" was seldom mentioned.'56 But
the Court asserted that "where the issue was discussed at all, the
courts had rejected the proposition that a municipality should be
privileged where it reasonably believed its actions to be lawful."' 57
Mr. Justice Brennan conceded that American tort law of the
nineteenth century did extend two forms of immunity to local
governments: for actions taken in a "governmental" rather than a
"proprietary" capacity and for "discretionary" as opposed to
"ministerial" acts. He concluded, however, that neither immunity
supported the adoption of a good-faith immunity for local governments under section 1983. With respect to the immunity for governmental functions, he argued that the derivation of the immunity
from the doctrine of sovereign immunity suggested at least two
reasons for rejecting it "as the basis for the qualified privilege [the
city] claims under § 1983":... (1) since sovereign immunity was an absolute immunity within the areas it covered, "the presence or
absence of good faith is simply irrelevant"; 59 and (2) "more fundamentally," any immunity deriving from sovereign immunity is
abrogated "by the sovereign's enactment of [section 1983] making
[the local government] amenable to suit."'60 Mr. Justice Brennan also
rejected the immunity for discretionary acts as an appropriate
source for a good-faith immunity. In actions brought under section

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
of this
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id. at 1408.
Id.
Id. at 1419.
Id. at 1410.
Id., citing Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511, 515-16 (Mass. 1837). For a criticism
reliance on Thayer, see 100 S. Ct. at 1430 (Powell, J., dissenting).
100 S. Ct. at 1413.
Id.
Id. at 1413-14.
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1983, a court passing judgment does not, he argued, "seek to secondguess the 'reasonableness' of the city's decision nor to interfere with
the local government's resolution of competing policy
considerations"; 6' it simply enforces constitutional requirements,
which the municipality has no discretion to disobey.
The majority also attempted to justify its decision on the
broader grounds of "the legislative purpose in enacting the statute
and . . . considerations of public policy."'6 2 The central aim of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 (from which section 1983 derives) was, the
Court declared, to create a remedy for those persons who had been
wronged by the misuse of power that ultimately is based on the
authority of the state, and it would be "uniquely amiss' to allow the
government itself "to disavow liability for the injury it has begotten."'63 Terming the availability of a damage remedy "a vital componenent of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional
guarantees,"'6 4 Mr. Justice Brennan concluded that creating a goodfaith defense for local governments would substantially limit the
damage remedy under section 1983; because good faith already had
been recognized as a defense in suits against individual officers,
"many victims of municipal malfeasance would be left remediless if
the [local government] were allowed to assert a good-faith
defense."'6 5
In addition to remedying past abuses, Mr. Justice Brennan
argued that denial of the good-faith defense would also serve the
broader statutory purposes by deterring "future constitutional
deprivations" through the creation of "an incentive for officials who
may harbor doubts about the lawfulness of their intended actions to
err on the side of protecting citizens' constitutional rights."'6 6 Nor
did the majority discern in suits against governmental units either
of the two "overriding considerations of public policy" that prompted the qualified immunity defense in cases seeking to impose liability on individuals-the injustice of holding an individual personally
liable for exercising discretion that he is required to exercise by the
obligations of his position, and the danger that personal liability
161. Id. at 1415.
162. Id.
163. Id. This language seems somewhat of a hyperbole as applied to local governments, since neither states nor the federal government are subject to liability under
section 1983. See 100 S. Ct. at 1425 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
164. 100 S. Ct. at 1415.
165. Id. at 1416.
166. Id. Mr. Justice Powell's dissent, 100 S. Ct. at 1425 n.9, points out that this
claim is inconsistent with the majority's argument, 100 S. Ct. at 1416, that its decision
will have no impact on the functioning of local governments.
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would deter officers from executing their offices "with the
decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good."'87 As
for the alleged injustice of personal liability, it was "simply not implicated when the damage award comes not from the official's
pocket, but from the public treasury."'' Similarly, the possible inhibiting effect that potential liability might have on an official's
decisiveness and judgment is "significantly reduced, if not
eliminated ...when the threat of personal liability is removed."'8 9
Any remaining apprehension about the local government's potential
"liability for constitutional violations is quite properly the concern
of its elected or appointed officials,"'7 0 who should always consider
whether their decision comports with constitutional mandates.
Ultimately, however, the Court chose to base its decision on
risk-distribution principles. Rejecting "blameworthiness" as "the
acid test of liability," the majority advocated using "the principle of
equitable loss-spreading" as well as fault in deciding how to
distribute "the costs of official misconduct.''. It argued that the
Owen decision "properly allocate[d] these costs among the three
principals" in a 1983 action by assuring the victim of compensation,
by protecting the offending official from personal liability "so long
as he conducts himself in good faith," and by forcing the public to
bear liability only when the official's "edicts or acts may fairly be
said to represent official policy.""'
The refusal to establish a good-faith immunity merits qualified
approval. But most of the arguments that Mr. Justice Brennan advanced to support it are makeweights, and the application of the
rule in the specific case before the Court was a dubious one. The
basic reason for rejecting the good-faith immunity defense for local
governments is the risk-distribution argument articulated at the
very end of the majority opinion. Its basic premise is a widely accepted principle in modern American tort law; to wit, in deciding
whether an injured party or the one causing injury should bear the
cost of an injury, one should place the loss on the party that is best
able to spread it among the community at large, at least in the
167. 100 S. Ct. at 1417, quoting Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
168. 100 S. Ct. at 1417. That the Court did not completely abandon a moral basis
for its decision is shown by the reference to "[ellemental notions of fairness [which] dictate that one who causes a loss should bear the loss." Id. Of course, American tort law
has never recognized any such principle that would make an individual responsbile for
damages caused by his lawful conduct.
169. Id. at 1418.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1419.
172. Id.
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absence of strong policy reasons calling for imposing it on the other
party. 7 ' Since the overriding policy reasons that lead to the adoption of the qualified immunity in actions seeking to impose personal
liabiity on officials-unfairness to the official and the potential
adverse impact on the performance of public officials-apply with
much less force in actions against the government itself, the general
principle requires imposition of liability on the government even
when the policy causing injury was adopted in good faith. In effect,
the Court decided, quite properly in this observer's estimation, that
actions against local governments are a useful way of transferring
from the injured party to the community at large the risk of injury
resulting from constitutional violations.
The other arguments advanced in the majority opinion are not
very convincing. In the first place, Mr. Justice Brennan's rejection
of the traditional tort immunities applicable to local governments as
a valid base for developing a good-faith immunity under section 1983
misconstrues the nature of the argument advanced by the proponents of the immunity. The argument that the existence of the
nineteenth-century immunities counsels adoption of a good-faith immunity under section 1983 does not, as Mr. Justice Brennan suggests,'7 ' indicate that the good-faith immunity was logically derived
from either of the nineteenth-century immunities. Instead, the proponents of immunity urged that the existence of the earlier immunities justified an inference that the Congress that adopted section 1983 did not intend to impose unqualified liability on local
governments. Thus, they argued, the Court's development of doctrinal limits on liability was consistent with the underlying congressional purpose. '
In addition to misconstruing the argument relying on the nineteenth century immunities, the majority opinion also distorts the
history of the immunity doctrines during the nineteenth century. To
suggest that by 1871 the general rule of tort law was liabiltiy for all
actions of local governments with minor exceptions permitting immunity for "governmental" and "discretionary" actions' 76 is to rewrite
history. As Mr. Justice Powell points out in dissent,'71 the general
173. New Zealand's Accident Compensation Act, 1972 N. Zealand Acts, No. 43, has
carried this concept, which forms the basis for such contemporary proposals as no-fault
insurance for automobile accidents, to its logical conclusion by eliminating traditional
tort liability for all accidential infliction of personal injury and substituting therefor a
general compensation scheme.
174. 100 S. Ct. at 1413.
175. 100 S. Ct. at 1423-24, 1428-30 (Powell, J., dissenting).
176. 100 S. Ct. at 1410-15.
177. 100 S. Ct. at 1428-30 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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rule of the nineteenth century was immunity for local governments,
although the exceptions for "proprietary" and "mandatory" acts
modified the immunity principle in certain situations.17
This misreading of history also forms the basis for the
majority's questionable reliance on legislative history and the broad
language of the statute. Basically, the majority relies on the
remedial nature of the Act and the failure of opponents to suggest
that the liability imposed on local governments was anything less
than absolute. That approach seems less than persuasive if a general
immunity for local governments existed at the time Congress was
legislating. A more natural interpretation of the silence would be to
conclude that Congress did not mean to "impinge on a tradition so
well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the
general language"'' of the statute.
If, as this critique urges, the justification for the rejection of the
good-faith immunity stems principally (and perhaps solely) from a
risk-distribution analysis, one can suggest some logical qualifications
to the general approval the Court's approach deserves. These
qualifications stem from a recognition that local governments offer a
less than totally satisfactory method of risk distribution because of
the stringent financial limits under which they operate."
As a
result of these limits, the real choice for a local government is often
not between visiting the loss on the individual party or forcing all
members of the community to bear a proportionate share of the loss
but between forcing the injured party to bear all or some part of
the loss or cutting back services generally available to the public.
At least two qualifications seem to follow from any appreciation
of the realities of local government finance. First, the Court should
be sensitive to the need to limit the nature of damages recoverable
from local governments. The Court has taken a good first step in
this direction in Carey v. Piphus,8 1 by allowing only nominal
178. See generally Greenhill & Murto, Governmental Tort Immunity, 49 TEX. L.
REV. 462, 463 (1971); Kramer, The Government Tort Immunity Doctrine in the United
States: 1790-1955, 1966 U. ILL. L. F. 795, 815-18. for a comprehensive survey of the
precedents through the early twentieth century, see Borchard, Government Liability
in Tort (Pts. I-II), 34 YALE L. J. 129, 229 (1924).
179. 100 S. Ct. at 1408, quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
180. Because of the spreading of the risk and the fewer limits on taking authority,
either the states or the federal government would provide better means of riskdistribution, but neither is covered by section 1983. See note 163, supra. Insofar as
fault retains some influence as a basis for liability, the argument for imposing liability
on local governments is even more persuasive, see Local Government Law-1977-78
Term, supra note 13, at 875-76; but so is the argument for a rule giving new constitutional pronouncements prospective effect only.
181. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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damages in 1983 actions for procedural errors that do not infringe
upon substantive rights or cause economic loss to the plaintiff.
Perhaps the greatest need for the future is to articulate doctrines
that will hold non-quantifiable general damages for pain and suffering, mental anguish, humiliation, and the like within reasonable
bounds. Such an approach will strike an appropriate balance between visiting great economic loss on an injured party and forcing a
local government to choose whether to satisfy its tort obligations
or to provide essential services to the community.
As a second qualification stemming from an appreciation of the
difficult financial position of local governments, the Court should
limit liability to situations where the government's policies violated
the Constitution when the complainant suffered injury. Not only is it
unfair to burden the already strained treasuries of local governments for actions that were lawful when taken, but the equities on
the side of a person who is injured by the lawful policies of the
government seem much less compelling. To hold otherwise is to suggest that the government is responsible for compensating all individuals harmed by its actions, surely a considerable expansion of
the Owens principles."'2 One should emphasize that this qualification
is much narrower than the good-faith immunity rule advocated in
the Owen dissent; it urges that local governments deserve protection from a retroactive application of new constitutional requirements, not that they should be immunized for all honest
mistakes. Essentially, this second qualification adopts the prospectivity rule adopted by most state courts (except in the case where
the new doctrine was established) as they abolished various immunity doctrines during the course of the past several decades, 8 ' a
doctrine that generally has been endorsed as a fair compromise of
the competing goals of compensating victims and of protecting local
governments from unanticipated financial burdens that might have
catastrophic consequences. 8 '
182. Indeed, such a principle would offer a striking contrast to the Court's refusal
to expand the federal government's liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act
beyond the relatively narrow bounds of negligence. See Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797
(1972). See generally Keenan, Nelms v. Laird: Absolute Liability Shattered by Sonic
Boom, 16 A.F.L. REV. 29 (Winter 1974).
183. See, e.g., Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Molitor v.
Kaneland Comm. Unit School Dist., 18 Il. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Holytz v. City of
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962). The United States Supreme Court
has held that a state may constitutionally announce a rule that is entirely prospective.
Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
184. See 100 S. Ct. at 1425 n.11; Molitor v. Kaneland Comm. Unit School Dist., 18
Ill. 2d 11, 41-42, 163 N.E.2d 89, 104 (1959) (immunity abrogated in a suit involving a
school bus carrying 18 children); Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalitiesfor
Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922, 958 (1976).
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This second qualification leads naturally to criticism of the
Supreme Court's actual decision in Owen. Since Police Chief Owen
was fired before the 1972 Supreme Court decisions establishing the
constitutional principle on which the police chief challenged his
discharge, 85 the argument of Mr. Justice Powell's dissent " ' that
liability was being foisted on the city for actions that were legal
when they were taken seems correct. At the very least, the majority should have attempted to demonstrate that prior decisions
had sufficiently established the principle to justify retroactive application of the 1972 decisions. 8
The impact of Owen is likely to be considerable. The decision indicates the need for insuring that all official policies of local governments are reviewed by a competent attorney before they are implemented, as well as for conducting a continuing review of existing
policies to make certain that they satisfy current constitutional requirements.'88 Moreover, as Mr. Justice Brennan clearly intended, 8 '
attorneys conducting such reviews probably should err on the side
of protecting individual rights, since the financial consequences for
the city (not to 'mention the malpractice exposure of the attorney)
could be considerable if one mistakenly failed to afford protection to
a right that the Supreme Court later upheld as entitled to constitutional protection.
One safely can predict an increasing number of section 1983 actions against local governments as litigants force the Court to
delineate the precise paramenters of the liability that the Monell
and Owens decisions have imposed.' 8 The Louisiana experience in
abolishing governmental immunity is illustrative of the problems
that can be anticipated, for abolishing the traditional immunity has
proved to be only the initial step in resolving what local governments should be responsible to what injured parties for what types
of acts.' 9'
185. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Police Chief Owen alleged that
public statements made at the time of his dismissal created a defamatory impression
that required the city to conduct a hearing.
186. 100 S. Ct. at 1421 (Powell, J., dissenting).
187. The majority's only discussion of whether Owen's substantive rights were
violated is found in a footnote. 100 S. Ct. at 1406 n.13.
188. A one-time review of existing policies will not suffice because the limits of the
various constitutional rights involved change over time.
189. 100 S. Ct. at 1416.
190. As one example, the Court will have to define exactly what injuries can properly be said to result from official governmental policy.
191. For illustrations of some of the recent Louisiana problems, see The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Local Government Law, 40
LA. L. REV. 681, 710-16 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Local Government Law-1978-79
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Owen also may serve, by way of analogy, as a model in other
cases involving the potential tort liability of governments. To the
extent that its risk-distribution principles form a convincing basis
for decision, it may encourage states, like Louisiana, that have
abolished the immunity of governmental units for nonconstitutional
torts to develop official immunity doctrines that will protect individual officers from liability while at the same time insuring compensation to the injured victim." ' Owen also suggests reexamination
of some judicially developed limits on the liability of the federal
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 9 ' For example, the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to immunize
the government whenever the official immunity doctrine would immunize an individual officer 9 ' appears completely inconsistent with
the Owen rationale. More fundamentally, the Court might seek to
restrict the discretionary function exception of the Act,' 5 which
seems questionable when analyzed from a risk-distribution point of
view, since imposing liability on the federal government seems an
appropriate vehicle for spreading even catastrophic losses.
Identification of the Responsible Governmental Entity
At the state level, the past year has seen further litigation
aimed at determining who is liable for the acts of various public servants. In Foster v. Hampton (Foster II),'9s the Louisiana Supreme
Term]; Local Government Law-1977-78 Term, supra note 13, at 869-79; The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term, 38 LA. L. REV. 462, 474-82
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Local Government Law-1976-77 Term].
192. Louisiana has achieved essentially the same result for school officials by requiring school boards to idemnify officials held liable in tort so long as the official does
not act maliciously or intentionally injure the plaintiff. LA. R.S. 17:416.1(B) (Supp.
1975). See McKinney v. Greene, 379 So. 2d 69 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 381
So.2d 1233, 1235 (La. 1980). For an unsuccessful attempt, under Louisiana law, to protect individual officers while imposing liability on the municipal employer, see Judge
Redman's dissent in Gordon v. City of New Orleans, 363 So. 2d 235, 242 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 371 So. 2d 768 (La. 1979).
193. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (1976).
194. Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1003
(1978). Far more consistent with the Owen rationale is Judge Butzner's dissent, which
argued that "[nlo principle of common law, no statute or decisional precedent, either
state or federal, authorizes the government to substitute its officer's personal immunity for the sovereign immunity, which an Act of Congress waives." 581 F.2d at 398
(Butzner, J., dissenting).
195. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
Still another rule seemingly inconsistent with the risk-distribution approach is the
refusal to hold the government liable under modern concepts of strict liability. See
Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
196. ' 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980). Justices Marcus and Blanche dissented. Mr. Justice
Marcus' dissenting opinion argued that, since the state was not a party in Foster I,
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Court converted to an explicit holding its dicta in Foster I,"' which
declared that a deputy sheriff was an employee of the state rather
than of the sheriff for whom he worked or of the parish within
whose boundaries he served. Moreover, the court also held that filing a suit against the deputy sheriff interrupted prescription against
the state. Overruling the 1948 decision of Cox v. Shreveport Packing
Company,9 ' the court abandoned the distinction between perfect and
imperfect solidarity199 and ruled that, since an employer's liability
for the acts of his employee "has been recognized as a solidary one,"
the person injured "has only one cause of action against both, and
suit against either the employer or the employee will interrupt
2
prescription as to the other.""
'
At least one recent decision by a court of appeal indicates a willingness to read extremely broadly the portion of the Foster I
holding that relieves sheriffs of vicarious liability for most torts
committed by their deputies. In Nolen v. State,"°' the third circuit
upheld, on an exception of no cause of action, dismissal of the sheriff
as a defendant in a suit arising out of the alleged failure of two
deputies to prevent a shooting. Despite allegations that the sheriff
had been guilty of negligence in the hiring, training, and supervision
"the statement therein that the state may be considered the deputy sheriffs employer
was dicta" and should not be followed. 381 So. 2d at 791 (Marcus, J., dissenting). On
more mature consideration, he concluded that the deputy was "an employee of the
sheriff who is an officer of the state" and that the state should not "be responsible for
the actions of constitutionally empowered officials and their employees." Id. In view of
this conclusion, he did not address the issue of whether Cox v. Shreveport Packing
Co., 213 La. 53, 34 So. 2d 373 (1948), should be overruled.
The dissent's attempt to distinguish Foster I was only half persuasive. Although the
statement that the state was the deputy sheriffs employer was dicta, the dissent's
position-that the sheriff was his employer-conflicted with the holding of Foster I.
197. 352 So. 2d 197 (La. 1977); for an analysis of the Foster I decision, see Local
Government Law-1977-78 Term, supra note 13, at 871-79.
198. 213 La. 53, 34 So. 2d 373 (1948).
199. See Cline v. Crescent City R.R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 1031, 6 So. 851 (1889). Cline
defined imperfect solidarity as solidarity in which the parties are bound for the same
thing but not on the same basis. Foster II rejected the distinction between perfect and
imperfect solidarity because it lacked any statutory basis. 381 So. 2d at 791.
200. 381 So. 2d at 791.
201. 377 So. 2d 586 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979). Judge Swift filed a dissenting opinion
that Judge Guidry joined. He argued that neither Foster I nor R.S. 33:1433 protected
the sheriff because the plaintiff based his suit not "on any vicarious liability of the
sheriff for the negligence of the deputies" but on the contention that the sheriff was
"himself a joint tortfeasor by reason of his own independent negligence." 377 So. 2d at
589 (Swift, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Since the statutory protection imposed
a limited vicarious liability on the sheriff, it was unreasonable to interpret it also as
manifesting a legislative intention "to relieve him from liability for his own negligent
acts or omissions," and the dissent argued, therefore, that "the petition states a cause
of action in this respect." Id-
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of his deputies, as well as in the adoption of law enforcement procedures, the appellate court nonetheless ruled that "Itihe trial court
was correct in finding no personal or individual cause of action
against the sheriff upon this basis." ' 2 A proper interpretation of
Foster I and R.S. 33:1433,203 the court asserted, limited the sheriff's
liability for the actions of his deputies to situations in which he was
personally present or personally directed the specific conduct that
injured the party who is complaining. 4 Moreover, the court was unwilling to find that the allegations in the plaintiff's petition were
sufficient to establish that the sheriff had breached any duty that
the law imposed on him. Although the court recognized that "Louisiana Constitutional and statutory provisions mandate the performance of varied ministerial duties by the sheriffs," it professed an
inability to discover any provisions requiring the sheriff to hire only
qualified persons as deputies, imposing on a sheriff the duty to train
his deputies properly, or directing the sheriff to adopt safe and proper police practices."' In the absence of such explicit statutory requirements, the court declared its unwillingness to impose "these
obligations on the sheriffs" judicially;2"0 and it therefore affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of the action against the sheriff.
Other decisions in the state's courts of appeal reflect a continuing inability to define the status of persons who occupy positions
that are classified as "state offices" because they were created by
state law. Without even citing Foster I or other decisions defining a
state office as one created by state law, 0 7 the fourth circuit ruled, in
202. 377 So. 2d at 587.
203. LA. R.S. 33:1433 (1950). At the time of the sheriff's alleged negligence, the
statute provided that a sheriff was personally liable for torts committed by his
deputies only when the deputy "in the commission of the said act or tort, acts in compliance with a direct order of, and in the personal presence of, the said sheriff at the
time the act or tort is committed." A 1978 statute, 1978 La. Acts, No. 318, deleted this
provision. For an analysis of the effect of the 1978 amendment, see Local Government
Law-1977-78 Term, supra note 13, at 877-78.
204. The court also purported to rely on LeJeune v. Allstate Ins. Co., 365 So. 2d
471 (La. 1978). LeJeune, however, did not concern the vicarious liability of an official
or governmental entity; it dealt with the plaintiff's ability to proceed against an insurance company that had issued a liability policy covering tortious acts by the deputy.
205. 377 So. 2d at 588. The court did not cite any of the constitutional and
statutory provisions to which it referred.
206. Id. The court went so far as to express doubts as to whether it was "constitutionally empowered" to develop such limits. Id. In view of the vagueness of the relevant legislative provisions, such doubts appear frivolous. See notes 230-31, infra, and
accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., State v. Dark, 195 La. 139, 150, 196 So. 47, 50 (1940); State v. Titus,
152 La. 1011, 1015, 95 So. 106, 107 (1922); Cosenza v. Aetna Ins. Co., 341 So. 2d 1304,
1305 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977). Cf. LA. R.S. 42:1 (1950) ("[A] public office means any state,
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Mullins v. State,"8 that a coroner is a "parochial officer" and not "a
state agency." ' 9 The basis for the court's ruling is not entirely clear.
The opinion notes the constitutional provisions establishing the office of coroner as well as various statutory provisions applicable to
coroners."' But the opinion appears to base its determination that
the coroner is a parochial officer on the parish's responsibility for
the "necessary and unavoidable expenses" of the office,2" the coroner's duty to report to the parish governing authority on a regular
basis," 2 and the constitution's authorization for the parish governing
authority to fill vacancies in the office." 3
Confusion also continues to shroud the status of other officials
who serve within the borders of particular local governments. A
good example of the confusion is the third circuit's recent decision in
Hryhorchuk v. Smith,"4 which held that the constable of the fifth
ward of Calcasieu Parish was not an employee of the parish police
jury."' In reaching this decision, the Hryhorchuk opinion principally
relied on the supreme court's 1977 decision in Savoie v. Fireman's
Fund Insurance Company,"6 which sets "forth succinctly the criteria
for the finding of an employee-employer realtionship. 2"' An extensive quotation from Savoie declared that "the most important element to be considered [in deciding if an employment relationship ex-

district, parish or municipal office, elective or appointive . . . when the office or position is established by the constitution or laws of this state.") (emphasis supplied). The
statute creating the office of constable is R.S. 13:2581.2.
208. 378 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
209. Id. at 506.
210. Id, citing LA. CONST. art. V, §§ 29, 31 (creating office of coroner and protecting him from a diminution of his salary during his term of office); LA. R.S. 33:1551-68
(1950 & Supp. 1966) (prescribing the qualifications and duties of coroners); LA. R.S.
33:1558(B) (Supp. 1978) (setting maximum fees that the coroner may charge); LA. R.S.
33:6137 (Supp. 1954) (making coroners and their assistants eligible for the Parochial
Employees Retirement System).
211. 378 So. 2d at 506, citing LA. R.S. 33:1558(B) (Supp. 1978).
212. 378 So. 2d at 506, citing LA. R.S. 33:1566 (Supp. 1952) (requiring semiannual
reports to police juries by all coroners); LA. R.S. 33:1632 (Supp. 1956) (requiring annual
report to parish governing authority by the Jefferson Parish coroner).
213. LA. CONST. art. V, § 30.
214. 379 So. 2d 281 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 381 So. 2d 1225, 1226,
1231 (La. 1980).
215. The court also concluded the constable was not an employee or agent of the
sheriff, the State Department of Public Safety, or the State Department of Transportation because all of these defendants had an even more attenuated relationship with the
constable than did the police jury. Id. at 289. The court did not discuss whether the
state (apart from a specific state department) might be liable under the rationale of
Foster I & II.
216. 347 So. 2d 188 (La. 1977).
217. 379 So. 2d at 289.
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ists] is the right of control and supervision over an individual," and
suggested a number of factors bearing on the control issue: "the
selection and engagement of the worker, the payment of wages, ...
the power of control and dismissal,"2 8 and the existence of a
"synallagmatic contract . . . by which one party gives to the other
the enjoyment of . . . his labor, at a fixed price."2 9 Judged by these
standards, the court of appeal concluded that the parish police jury
did not have an employment relationship with the constable. He had
no synallagmatic contract with the parish, nor did the parish select
or engage him for employment, supervise him, or have the power to
dismiss him. Although the police jury did contribute to his wages,22°
this wage contribution was, the court declared, insufficient to make
him a parish employee.
The third circuit's analysis of the employment issue emphasized
that, as a legislatively created office, the office of constable fell
within the established definition of a "state office" as "one created
22
It then cited Foster I and its
by the constitution or state statute.""
Company... as absolvInsurance
v.
Aetna
own precedent in Cosenza
ing parishes of all liability for torts committed by state officers over
22
The court
whom they exercise "no power, authority or discretion.""
distinguished the seemingly contrary precedent of Honeycutt v.
Town of Boyce224 on the ground that the relationship between the
marshall and the town "was assumed rather than discussed" in
Honeycutt because the earlier decision was based on pleadings that
alleged that the marshal injured the plaintiff while the former "was
25
performing duties incident to his employment with [the town]."
The implications of Foster II extend beyond local government
law, for the case states a general principle of obligations that ap-.
plies to all employment relationships.22 But from the vantage point
218. Id. quoting Savoie v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 188, 191 (1977).
219. 379 So. 2d at 289, quoting LA. CIVIL CODE. art. 2669.
220. 379 So. 2d at 289. See LA. R.S. 13:2586.1 (Supp. 1975).
221. 379 So. 2d at 290. See note 207, supra.
222. 341 So. 2d 1304 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977). For a critique of the Cosenza decision,
see Local Government Law-1976-77 Term, supra note 191, at 477-80.
223. 379 So. 2d at 291.
224. 341 So. 2d 327 (La. 1976). For a critique of the Honeycutt decision, see Local
Government Law-1976-77 Term, supra note 191, at 476-77, 479-80. See also Local
Government Law-1978-79 Term, supra note 191, at 710-11.
225. 379 So. 2d at 291. This distinction is not persuasive. Although the supreme
court's treatment of the issue is cursory, the opinion of the third circuit explicitly
acknowledges that the marshal's office was legislatively created. See Honeycutt v.
Town of Boyce, 327 So. 2d 154, 158 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 341 So.
2d 327 (La. 1976).
226. See p. 355 supra. Comment, Prescribing Solidarity: Contributing to the Indemnity Dilemna, 41 La. L. Rev. 659 (1981).
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of local government law, the decision deserves praise in two
respects. First, the court seems, in Foster II, to have served the
cause of justice in the specific case before it. The omission of the
state as a defendant in the original action was understandable
because an unchallenged precedent of the fourth circuit declared
that the state was not the employer of a deputy sheriff. 27 To have
denied compensation to the Foster plaintiff simply because his attorney failed to anticipate a rather abrupt shift in doctrine seems
unfair, especially in the absence of any claim that the delay in naming the state prejudiced its ability to defend on the merits. Second,
Foster II promotes judicial efficiency by making it less necessary for
future plaintiffs to name the state and all local governments in the
area as defendants in every lawsuit resulting from the acts of a
public servant. If a contrary rule had been adopted, the only effective way any attorney could have protected his client's interest in
the face of the uncertainty that characterizes current Louisiana doctrine would have been to name the state in every action, no matter
how small the likelihood of actual recovery might appear. Many attorneys will doubtless still follow that practice, but Foster II at
least ensures that the attorney who chooses his potential defendants
with more circumspection will not be penalized for some unanticipated change in doctrine.
The various decisions of the courts of appeal reflect the failure
of the supreme court to articulate coherent principles for imposing
tort liability on local governments and officials. Nolen's extension of
the immunity for sheriffs is particularly unfortunate; surely, reasonable implications of the statute authorizing the sheriff to appoint
deputies"2 8 are requirements that the sheriff hire only persons who
meet certain minimal standards and that he offer some minimal
level of training and supervision to those who are hired, and an
equally reasonable implication of the constitution's provision making
the sheriff the chief law enforcement officer in the parish he
serves" 9 is a requirement that he adopt procedures that fall within
the range of acceptable police practices. Fortunately, the practical
significance of Nolen is limited because FosterI & II give the plain227. Wambles v. State, 283 So. 2d 331 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973). After a last-ditch attempt by the first circuit to dismiss Foster I, Michaelman v. Amiss, 376 So. 2d 1029
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 382 So. 2d 166 (La. 1980) (per curiam),
Wambles seems to have been overruled on its specific facts in a decision rendered at
the beginning of the 1980-81 term. Michaelman v. Amiss, 385 So. 2d 404 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 So. 2d 800 (La. 1980).
228. LA. R.S. 33:1433 (Supp. 1968 & 1978).
229. LA. CONST. art. V, § 27. For a discussion of the significance of this provision,
see Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 37 LA. L.
REV. 765, 841-43 (1977).
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tiff a cause of action against the state, normally a preferable defendant to an individual sheriff. Indeed, the practical limit to the
significance of Nolen may well explain why the plaintiffs did not
seek supreme court review of the decision.
Considered together, the Mullins and Hryhorchuk decisions
reveal the inadequacy of the "state officer" label to define the
varied relationships among the state, local governments, and officials who serve within local government boundaries. Carried to its
logical extreme, the "state officer" rationale would impose liability
on the state rather than the local government for all officials in all
local governments except those with home rule charters, since all
such offices originate in a state statute. Past decisions strongly suggest that even the third circuit is unlikely to reach that logical absurdity,23 but the task now before the supreme court is to develop
tests for identifying those officers serving within a local government's geographic boundaries for which the local government will be
required to assume responsibility. 31 The court has granted certiorari
in Hryhorchuk, and one can hope, therefore, that the court will use
it as the vehicle for articulating some clear principles to guide
future decisions.
Corporal Punishment in Public Schools
"[S]ubject to any rules as may be adopted by the parish or city
school board," R.S. 17:416.1(A)232 authorizes public school employees
to "employ . . . reasonable disciplinary and corrective measures to
maintain order in the school," and recent decisions by the state's
courts of appeal have uniformly concluded that this provision
permits corporal punishment so long as it is reasonable under the
circumstances.233 Some of the opinions have emphasized that deter230. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Lake Charles, 295 So. 2d 914 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
231. The ultimate impact of Foster I may be to cast the state into a role as
residual employer of all public servants for whose torts no local government is forced
to assume responsibility. See Local Government Law-1976-77 Term, supra note 191,
at 480 n.103.
232. LA. R.S. 17:416.1(A) (Supp. 1975).
233. LeBoyd v. Jenkins, 381 So. 2d 1290, 1291 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980); LeBlanc v.
Tyler, 381 So. 2d 908, 908 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980); McKinney v. Greene, 379 So. 2d 69,
71 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (La. 1980); White v. Richardson, 378 So. 2d 162, 162-63 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979); Thompson v. Iberville Parish
School Bd., 372 So. 2d 642, 644 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied 374 So. 2d 650 (La.
1979). See generally Comment, Corporal Punishment of Students-The State's
Authority and Constitutional Considerations, 36 LA. L. REV. 984, 986-90 (1976). The
United States Supreme Court has ruled that the imposition of corporal punishment
does not violate the student's constitutional rights even if the student receives no
prior hearing concerning the underlying conduct. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651
(1977).
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mining whether a particular instance of corporal punishment is reasonable requires a consideration of numerous factors such as "the
age and physical condition of the pupil, the seriousness of the misconduct eliciting the punishment, the nature and severity of the
punishment, the teacher's motive in the discipline, the attitude and
past behavior of the child and the availability of less severe but
equally effective means of discipline." 2 Nonetheless, nearly all of
the recent cases have tended to conclude rather summarily that the
corporal punishment was reasonable without detailed consideration
of individual factors. During the 1979-80 term, decisions of Louisiana's courts of appeal denied liability where a teacher "extended
his leg and pushed" a twelve-year-old student; 3 where one sixthgrade student gave another ten licks with a wooden paddle;23 where
as the result of a spanking that a teacher administered to a fourteen-year-old student, the student received bruises that "color
photographs taken at [a subsequent doctor's examination] seem[ed]
'
to indicate . . . were more than mild;"237
and where the teacher hit a
ten-year-old student on the hand with a leather strap, perhaps causing a bruised wrist and broken thumb."8
In two of the cases referenced above, the appellate courts actually reversed findings of the trial courts that the punishments
were excessive under the circumstances. 3 ' A trial court's decision
imposing liability was upheld in only one case, and even in that decision the court reduced a $500 damage award to $100. In McKinney
v. Greene,"' a divided panel of the third circuit held that a principal
234. Thompson v. Iberville Parish School Bd., 372 So. 2d 642, 644 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 650 (La. 1979). Accord, LeBoyd v. Jenkins, 381 So. 2d
1290, 1292 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
235. Thompson v. Iberville Parish School Bd., 372 So. 2d 642, 643 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 650 (La. 1979) (defendant's version of the incident).
236. White v. Richardson, 378 So. 2d 162 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979).
237. LeBlanc v. Tyler, 381 So. 2d 908, 909 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980). Judge
Domengeaux filed a brief concurring opinion in which he disavowed the majority statement that color photographs seemed to indicate the bruises in LeBlanc were more
than mild. In fact, he declared, the LeBlanc bruises were similar to those involved in a
1975 decision of the third circuit refusing to impose liability. 381 So. 2d at 910,
(Domengeaux, J., concurring), citing Roy v. Continental Ins. Co., 313 So. 2d 349 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1975).
238. LeBoyd v. Jenkins, 381 So. 2d 1290 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980). Considerable
evidence suggested that the plaintiffs injuries were no more than minimal, but the
court held that the punishment was reasonable even if the plaintiff's version of the incident, which is paraphrased in text, were accepted. Id. at 1292.
239. LeBlanc v. Tyler, 381 So. 2d 908 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980); Thompson v. Iberville
Parish School Bd., 372 So. 2d 642 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979). In Thompson, the court
refused the judgment against the teacher but affirmed the judgment against the school
board, which had not appealed.
240. 379 So. 2d 69 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (La.
1980). Judge Stoker dissented. He gave three reasons for his conclusion that the prin-
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who broke up a fight between two students by kicking "with the
side of his shoe" a thirteen-year-old student in the school's special
education program24"' had violated a school board resolution limiting
corporal punishment to "striking the student on the buttocks with a
paddle a maximum of five (5) times" but permitting school
employees to use "physical force, reasonable and appropriate under
the circumstances, to restrain a student from attacking another student."2 ' According to the court of appeal, the local resolution "clearly prohibited [the principal] from kicking students as a means of administering corporal punishment in normal disciplinary situations."2"3
Moreover, the principal's conduct was not permissible even "[a]ssuming for the sake of argument" that the exception allowing the use of
physical force to restrain one student from attacking another was
applicable. " The principal "has sufficient time to put down the
items in his hands, which would have allowed him to use a less offensive but equally effective method of restraining the child," and

cipal "was not guilty of an actionable tort": (1) the evidence did not "justify
characterizing the action of the . . . principal as 'kicking' [the plaintiff]"; (2) the
legislature did not intend language of R.S. 17:416.1(A) "to accord to local school boards
the privilege of setting up standards of civil liability for intentional torts through administrative directions or prohibitions"; and (3) the principal's actions were "reasonable
under the circumstances" and thus authorized under the local school board's resolution.
379 So. 2d at 74 (Stoker, J., dissenting).
After extensively quoting from the trial transcript, Judge Stoker concluded that,
although "in the general sense of the word [the principal] did kick" the plaintiff, that
action should not be characterized as a kick for tort purposes because of the lack of
significant force, the failure to use the point of the toe, and the lack of any physical
harm to the plaintiff. Instead, the action should be interpreted, not "as punishment"
but as an attempt to get the plaintiff's attention like a touch on the shoulder or a grip
on the arm. Id at 76.
Seeing "no reason to believe that the legislature meant to authorize differing standards of civil liability for intentional torts growing out of unreasonable or excessive
punishment administered to students by school authorities," he argued that the "subject to" language of R.S. 17:416.1(A) should be interpreted to confine local control to
the ability to "take administrative action against the school official." Id. This would
prevent the twin dangers of allowing local boards to authorize "types of punishment so
harsh, that they would be unacceptable under reasonable state standards" or permitting them to establish overly restrictive standards that would render the state statute
nugatory. Id, at 76-77.
Finally, the dissent opined that the principal had not committed a tort even if the
local resolution established the standard for civil liability. That regulation only concerned the administration of "corporal punishment," while the principal's action in
McKinney was merely "restraining and preventative action." Id. at 77 (emphasis in
original).
241. 379 So. 2d at 71.
242. Id. at 72, quoting Sabine Parish School Bd. Resolution, December 15, 1976.
243. 379 So. 2d at 72.
244. Id.
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his actions were not,
therefore, "reasonable and appropriate under
24' 5
the circumstances.
A natural response to an initial reading of the corporal punishment cases is to praise the courts for supporting school authorities
in these days of unrestrained criticism of public education. But more
careful reflection suggests that the courts not only have sustained
some punishments that seem unfair to the particular children involved, but that they also have neglected an opportunity to make
more concrete the vague "reasonableness" standard established by
the statute. At least two such concretizing possibilities seem obvious. On the one hand, the courts could have analyzed the cases
before them in detail with respect to the individual factors quoted
above. The cynic in one suggests that a reason they failed to do so
was the clarity with which such analyses would have revealed the
unreasonableness of the particular punishments being challenged,
for nearly all of the decisions involved corporal punishment being
administered by grown men in a pique of anger to relatively young
children for minor instances of misconduct. 2" A second method of
making the vague standard of reasonableness more definite would
have been to focus on the methods by which the punishment was
administered, for the recent cases reveal all of the following questionable procedures: administering corporal punishment by a fellow
student, 47 administering the punishment in a public setting that
maximizes the student's humiliation, 24 8 kicking a student,29 and striking a student on a part of his body other than the buttocks.250
None of the recent decisions seems to have involved serious injuries, 2 ' and the lack of special damages may explain the judicial
245. Id.
246. The one exception is LeBlanc v. Tyler, 381 So. 2d 908 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980),
which involved a spanking to a fourteen-year-old student by a female teacher; one is
somewhat surprised, therefore, to discover that the LeBlanc injuries were perhaps the
most serious of the five cases.
247. White v. Richardson, 378 So. 2d 162 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979).
248. All five decisions discussed in the text share this attribute.
249. McKinney v. Greene, 379 So. 2d 69 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d
1233, 1235 (La. 1980); Thompson v. Iberville Parish School Bd., 372 So. 2d 642 (La. App.
1st Cir.), cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 650 (La. 1979).
250. LeBoyd v. Jenkins, 381 So. 2d 1290 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
251. See id. at 1292 ("The type of paddling administered was less severe, and not
nearly so embarassing, as would have been a spanking on the backside, and none of
the other students were injured by it."); LeBlanc v. Tyler, 381 So. 2d 908, 909 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff's doctor testified that "as a rule in this type of situation
the injury is confined to the superficial areas of the skin"); White v. Richardson, 378
So. 2d 162, 163 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979) ("We note additionally that no evidence was
presented by the parents of the boy as to their observations concerning a description
or the extent of his injuries and, by his own testimony, no home treatment was used
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reluctance to impose liability even for unreasonable acts by school
employees. To the extent that this explanation reflects the true rationale of the cases, McKinney's approach of imposing liability but
awarding nominal damages would appear to be the far more rational
response.
Representatives of school boards and teachers are likely to
praise the recent decisions because almost all refused to impose
liability in the specific case before the court. But the failure to
develop definite standards may have adverse consequences for the
school systems themselves, because the vague criterion of reasonableness leaves one at the whim of the specific judge (or panel on
appeal) to which a particular case might be assigned in the future.252
Both to protect school employees and to offer redress to the occasional student who is abused, a school board would be well-advised,
notwithstanding the recent decisions, to adopt local rules incorporating procedures such as requirements for prior consultation
with parents before imposition of corporal punishment, the use of a
specified instrument for administering punishments, and administration of the punishment by a teacher or administrator in a private setting witnessed by another adult member of the school staff.
except the taking of baths from the time of paddling until he saw Dr. Walker");
Thompson v. Iberville Parish School Bd., 372 So. 2d 642, 645 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 374 So. 2d 650 (La. 1979) ("The lack of objective symptoms of injury convinces
us that the contact with Bryan was not excessively severe"). An additional explanation
in LeBoyd may have been an understandable judicial reluctance to impose liability for
an injury that allegedly occurred sixteen years earlier. 381 So. 2d at 1291.
252. Compare McKinney v. Greene, 379 So. 2d 69 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 381 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (La. 1980). with Thompson v. Iberville Parish School Bd.,
372 So. 2d 642 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 650 (La. 1979). Although the
McKinney opinion attempts to distinguish Thompson on the ground that McKinney involved a rule of the local school board, 379 So. 2d at 72 n.1, the two cases are really inconsistent. McKinney held its kicking was not "reasonable and appropriate under the
circumstances," id. at 72; on the contrary, Thompson held in kicking the student, its
teacher-defendant "acted reasonably under the particular circumstances of this case."
372 So. 2d at 645. Several older Louisiana cases illustrate the ability of a court to find
particular conduct unlawful and unacceptable under a standard of reasonableness. See
Houeye v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 223 La. 966, 67 So. 2d 553 (1953); Johnson v.
Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 241 So. 2d 588 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); Frank v. Orleans
Parish School Bd., 195 So. 2d 451 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 635, 197 So.
2d 653 (1967).

